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Abstract: 
The paper offers an empirical analysis of private antitrust enforcement in Germany 
based on cases that were decided by courts between 2005 and 2007. The study 
presents information about the magnitude and nature of civil antitrust actions in 
Germany. The data includes inter alia, information about the courts involved in litigation, 
the relationship of the parties, affected industries, the remedies sought, the outcome of 
the claim, the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the proportion of stand-alone and follow-
on litigation, and the length of proceedings before a given court. The study shows that a 
large number of private cases were concluded even when compared with public 
investigations in Germany. It seems that private antitrust actions complement rather 
than duplicate public enforcement efforts because of the overwhelming proportion of 
stand-alone claims and the amount of actions based on the abuse of market power. 
Only a small number of litigants asked for the compensation of loss suffered from 
anticompetitive conduct. Interpreting the results from the study cautiously, the paper 
suggests that the European Commission and other stakeholders may have 
misunderstood the nature of private actions in Germany (and maybe Europe) and, 
consequently, asked the wrong question, focusing on compensation. Expensive 
damages actions for the breach of the antitrust rules might not be as important as 
commonly assumed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, the enforcement of European competition law has seen major 
changes.1 Particularly the enactment of Regulation 1/2003 brought a notable shift 
towards the decentralised enforcement of the competition rules and the opportunity for 
the national courts to rule on private antitrust cases.2 While decentralised public 
enforcement within the European Competition Network seems to become a success 
story,3 the status of private enforcement of European competition law is less clear. Is it 
as underdeveloped as the European Commission claims? And if it is not, what do 
private antitrust actions in the Member States look like? And finally, are legislative 
measures required to foster the private rights of action? These and other questions 
have been subject to an extensive debate covering, for instance, issues like the goals, 
the appropriate role of private enforcement in combination with public enforcement and 
the potential features of private claims.4 The Courage5 decisions of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), and later the ruling in Manfredi,6 according to which individuals have 
the right to compensation, provided the background for the private antitrust discussion 
in Europe. 
 
Building on the Courage case, the European Commission took the initiative to build a 
framework for private antitrust litigation in the EU Member States. Under its damages 
actions reform („European private antitrust policy‟) the European Commission proposed 
                                                          
1
 The expressions competition law and antitrust law are used synonymously. 
2
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ 2003 L 1/1 (2002). 
3
 Hussein Kassim and Kathryn Wright, „Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: The Reform of EU Antitrust and 
Merger Control‟ [2009] 32 West European Politics 738; Firat Cengiz, „Regulation 1/2003 Revisited‟ [2009] SSRN 
eLibrary. 
4
 For the controversy about the role of private enforcement in Europe see, for instance, the debate between Wouter P 
Wils, „Should Private Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?‟ (2003) 26 World Competition 472. and Clifford A 
Jones, „Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check‟ (2004) 27 World Competition 
13, or the critical appraisal of Jürgen Basedow, „Das Kartelldeliktsrecht und der "More Economic Approach"‟ (2006) 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 97. For European developments of private antitrust enforcement in 
general see Clifford A Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1999); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), „Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust 
Law‟ (European Competition Law Annual 6.2001, 2003); Jürgen Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement of EC 
Competition Law (International competition law series, Kluwer Law International, Alphen a. d. Rijn 2007); Assimakis P 
Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National  Courts 
(Hart, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2008). 
5
 Courage Limited v Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-06297. 
6
 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] ECR I-6619. 
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rules to be implemented in the laws of the Member States. These rules aim at eased 
access to damages actions for those who have suffered a loss from breaches of Articles 
101 or 102 TFEU7.8 Maybe influenced by this development, some Member States have 
already undertaken steps to encourage and structure civil actions against breaches of 
national and EU competition law.9 Germany changed its Act Against Restraints of 
Competition (ARC) in 2005 facilitating actions against firms breaching the competition 
rules. Despite those efforts already undertaken in some Member States, the European 
private antitrust policy will, in all likelihood, necessitate further amendments of national 
laws. 
 
Although the proposed amendments have been extensively dealt with in the documents 
accompanying the reform,10 it seems that the underlying assumption about the nature 
and status of private antitrust enforcement received less attention. It is normally 
                                                          
7
 To avoid confusion I will refer to the current numbering of the EU competition rules under the Treaty of Lisbon 
throughout this paper. 
8
 European Commission, Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (Brussels 2005) 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#greenpaper accessed 26 March 
2010; European Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (Brussels 2008) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#whitepaper accessed 26 March 2010.  
9
 The UK Enterprise Act amended the Competition Act 1998 introducing rules to foster private claims. Section 47A of 
the Competition Act 1998 provides for monetary follow-on claims before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Section 
47B provides for consumer claims by specified bodies and section 58 and 58A declare findings of facts of the OFT 
and findings of an infringement by the OFT or Competition Appeal Tribunal binding in court proceedings. For further 
details see Barry J Rodger, „Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act: An Exemplary System of Awarding 
Damages‟ (2003) 24 European Competition Law Review 103; Barry J Rodger, „The Competition Act and the 
Enterprise Act Reforms: Sanctions and Deterrence in UK Competition Law‟ in Gerhard Dannecker and Oswald 
Jansen (eds), Competition Law Sanctioning in the European Union: The EU-law Influence on the National Law 
System of Sanctions in the European Area (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, New York 2004); Lesley Farrel and 
Sarah Ince, „United Kingdom: Private Enforcement‟ [2007] Oct Supp (The European Antitrust Review) G.C.R 226. 
Italy just recently introduced a class action devise. Alberto Martinazzi, „Developments in Private Enforcement of 
Italian Antitrust Law: The Introduction of “Class Action” Legislation‟ (2010) Competition Policy International 1. In 
Spain, the LEY 15/2007 de Defensa de la Competencia paved the way for a private enforcement of national and EC 
antitrust rules. Ignacio Sancho Gargallo, „Private Enforcement of EU and National Competition Law‟ [2009] 1 InDret. 
10
 Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the Conditions for the Claims of Damages in 
Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules: National Report United Kingdom (Brussels 2004); European 
Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: Annex to the Green Paper Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules (Brussels 2005) 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#staffpaper accessed 26 March 
2010; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (Brussels 2008) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#link1 accessed 26 March 2010; European 
Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (Brussels 2008) 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#link1 accessed 26 March 2010; 
Andrea Renda and others, Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential 
Scenarios: Final Report. Report for the European Commission Contract DG COMP/2006/A3/012 (Brussels, Rome, 
Rotterdam 2008) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html accessed 26 March 2010. 
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assumed that private antitrust enforcement in general, and private damages actions in 
particular, are totally underdeveloped in the Member States of the European Union. This 
belief originates from two – not primarily empirical – studies authorised by the European 
Commission.11 However, because of, or despite, these studies this main assumption 
lacks in-depth empirical evidence from most Member States12 and has sparked 
criticism.13 
 
This paper will pursue the empirical issue for one Member State further exploring the 
nature and magnitude of private antitrust enforcement in Germany. I will look at cases 
that were concluded before German courts between 2005 and 2007. Germany is 
probably a typical-atypical example for private antitrust litigation in the EU. Recent years 
have seen some legal changes in order to facilitate claims for the breach of competition 
law in both Germany and other Member States like the UK, Spain and Italy. With 
respect to the degree to which claim-facilitating rules have been implemented, Germany 
might be representative for other Member States. On the other hand, Germany is one of 
the economically strongest states in the EU27. It has also a comparatively long history 
of enforcement of national antitrust rules distinguishing it from most of its European 
neighbours. Germany may not stand pars pro toto for all Member States but it is hoped 
that this research provides an insight into extent and nature of private antitrust 
enforcement, especially in civil law jurisdictions, and feeds the debate about measures 
to enhance private antitrust enforcement with more data. 
 
Providing a brief overview about developments in European private antitrust 
enforcement in the next section, I will describe the current European private antitrust 
policy and parallel developments in Germany. As for Germany, I outline the legal 
framework for litigation against breaches of European and national competition law. The 
                                                          
11
 Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the Conditions for the Claims of Damages in 
Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report (Brussels 2004); Renda and others (n 11). 
12
 The notable exceptions are Rodger‟s studies in the United Kingdom: Barry J Rodger, „Competition Law Litigation in 
the UK Courts, A Study of All Cases to 2004‟ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 241; Barry J Rodger, 
„Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition Litigation Settlements in the United 
Kingdom, 2000-2005‟ (2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 96; Barry J Rodger, „Competition Law Litigation 
in the UK Courts: A Study of all Cases 2005-2008, Part I‟ (2009) 2 Global Competition Litigation Review 93. 
13
 Ulf Böge and Ost Konrad, „Up and Running, or Is It? Private Enforcement - The Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives‟ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 197. 
 4 
 
section concludes with a very brief summary of already existing studies of antitrust 
litigation. Section C describes the original data used for this study, the design of the 
study, the data collection process, and unfolds the limitations of this project. Part D 
presents the findings of my study. Part E concludes. 
 
2. Private antitrust developments in Europe 
 
In this part I outline the European and German private antitrust policy and the measures 
that are supposed to foster private antitrust actions. At the same time, I will look at the 
assumptions on which this private antitrust policy is based. 
 
2.1 European private antitrust policy 
Private enforcement of the competition laws in Europe gained increasing attention 
following the turn of the millennium.14 Especially after the ECJ‟s Courage ruling the 
debate gathered momentum. One of the reasons for the long absence of private 
antitrust from competition policy is probably the unique setup in Europe: while the 
European Commission and the European courts are very present in public competition 
law enforcement they have little influence on private antitrust litigation. Civil actions 
based on violations of competition rules are brought before the national courts of the 
Member States and the European courts are not competent to hear such claims in the 
first place. The European Court of Justice only rules on preliminary references made by 
national courts like, for instance, in the seminal Courage and Manfredi cases. Although 
the ECJ rarely rules on private cases, it did so with a wide impact on these two 
occasions. The dispute between Inntrepreneur Estates (formerly Courage) and Mr 
Crehan concerning a beer tie agreement led to the ECJ‟s Courage decision in 2001.15 
The Court stated that “[…] the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) 
                                                          
14
 For an overview about the discussion before see Barry J Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, „Wielding the Blunt 
Sword: Interim Relief for Breaches of EC Competition Law before the UK Courts‟ (1996) 17 European Competition 
Law Review 393; Andrew Maxwell and Stephen Kon, „Enforcement in National Courts of the E.C. and New U.K. 
Competition Rules: Obstacles to Effective Enforcement‟ (1998) 19 European Competition Law Review 443; Jones (n 
5). 
15
 Courage Limited v Bernard Crehan (n 6). For facts underpinning the Courage litigation see Michael Waterson, Beer 
- The Ties that Bind (2010) 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2010/twerp_930.pdf accessed 17 May 2010. 
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[Art 101(1)] would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages 
for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition.”16 This right of individuals to seek compensation for harm imposed on them 
by violations of the competition rules was confirmed again in Manfredi, a decision made 
upon reference from an Italian court.17 The Court held that it follows from the principle of 
effectiveness that national law should provide an effective (damages) remedy for any 
individual injured by a competition law violation. 
 
The Courage litigation finally put private antitrust enforcement on the agenda in Europe 
and sparked numerous comments and contributions related to private antitrust 
enforcement.18 The Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 endowing the national courts with 
the powers to decide in all matters related to Articles 101 and 102 accelerated the 
process because it opened the gates for an exhaustive application of European antitrust 
law in the courts of the Member States.19 The European Commission then took initiative 
and published its Green Paper on damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust 
rules.20 The Green Paper tried to identify the main obstacles for private actions and 
reflected on possible measures to improve the conditions for follow-on and stand-alone 
damages claims. Having received numerous comments on the Green Paper and taking 
                                                          
16
 Courage Limited v Bernard Crehan (n 6) para 26. 
17
 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA (n 7). 
18
 Barry J Rodger, „The Interface Between Competition Law and Private Law: Article 81, Illegality and Unjustified 
Enrichment‟ (2002) 6 Edinburgh Law Review 217; Jonathan Sinclair, „Damages in Private Antitrust Actions in Europe‟ 
(2002) 14 Loyola Consumer Law Review 547; Assimakis P Komninos, „New Prospects for Private Enforcement of EC 
Competition Law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community Right to Damages‟ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 
447; Rolf Hempel, Privater Rechtsschutz im Kartellrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse (Wirtschaftsrecht und 
Wirtschaftspolitik, 1
st
 edn Nomos-Verl.-Ges. Baden-Baden 2002); James Edelman and Okeoghene Odudu, 
„Compensatory Damages for Breach of Article 81‟ (2002) 27 European Law Review 327; Daniel Beard and Alison 
Jones, „Co-contractors, Damages and Article 81: The ECJ Finally Speaks‟ (2002) 23 European Competition Law 
Review 246; Wolfgang Wurmnest, „Zivilrechtliche Ausgleichsansprüche von Kartellbeteiligten bei Verstößen gegen 
das EG-Kartellverbot‟ (2003) 49 RIW 896; Wils (n 5); Rodger (n 10); Ehlermann and Atanasiu (eds) (n 5); Ehlermann 
and Atanasiu (eds) (n 5); Jürgen Basedow, „Private Enforcement of Article 81 EC: A German View‟ in Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (European Competition 
Law Annual, Hart, Oxford 2003); Katherine Holmes, „Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EC and UK‟ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 25; Arianna Andreangeli, „Courage 
v Crehan and the Enforcment of Article 81 EC Before the National Courts‟ (2004) 25 European Competition Law 
Review 758; Wils, Wouter P. J. Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005); Douglas 
H Ginsburg, „Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Europe‟ (2005) 1 Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics 427; Maja Brkan, „Procedural Aspects of Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Heading Toward 
New Reforms?‟ (2005) 28 World Competition 479. 
19
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1, 04.01.2003, 1-25. 
20
 European Commission, Green Paper (n 9). 
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into account the Manfredi case, the Commission released its White Paper on EC 
damages actions in 2008.21 In the White Paper, the Commission recommended a set of 
rules that should be introduced into the laws of the Member States to foster private 
damages actions for the infringement of Art 101 and 102.22 These proposals are 
claimed to be “[…] balanced measures that are rooted in European legal culture and 
traditions.”23 To implement these measures it would require significant changes in the 
substantial and procedural laws of most Member States. Subsequently, the Commission 
drafted a directive which basically contained the proposals laid out in the White Paper. 
This draft directive was put on hold because some Member States resisted the 
Commission‟s proposals. It remains to be seen whether the draft Directive can be 
adopted in its current form and despite the resistance of some Member States and the 
European Parliament. 
 
The debate about the private rights to action is based on the assumption that private 
enforcement is completely underdeveloped in Europe. It is taken for granted that private 
actions against anticompetitive behaviour are of little or no significance in the overall 
enforcement scheme in European countries. To illustrate their arguments commentators 
often refer to the US Georgetown Study that stated that 90 per cent of US antitrust 
enforcement between 1973 and 1983 were private.24 Despite this slightly skewed 
comparison, the assumption of underdevelopment in Europe is not entirely 
unsubstantiated. A considerable amount of resources has been spent to learn more 
                                                          
21
 European Commission, White Paper (n 9). 
22
 For a discussion of the various White Paper proposals see Renato Nazzini and Ali Nikpay, „Private Actions in EC 
Competition Law‟ (2008) 4 Competition Policy International 107; Christian Kersting, „Perspectives for Private 
Enforcement in European Antitrust Law‟ (2008) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1161254 accessed 16 September 2008; 
Christopher J Cook, „Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Member State Courts: Experience to Date and the 
Path Ahead‟ (2008) 4 Competition Policy International 3; Derek Ridyard, „Indirect Effects and Unintended 
consequences: a Comment on the Commission's white Paper on Private Actions‟ (2009) 2 Global Competition 
Litigation Review 115; Emmanuela Truli, „White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: The 
Binding Effect of Decisions Adopted by National Competition Authorities‟ (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 
795; Jeroen S Kortmann and Christof R A Swaak, „The EC White Paper on Antirust Damages Actions: Why the 
Member States are (right to be) less than enthusiastic‟ (2009) 30 European Competition Law Review 340; Mihail 
Danov, „Awarding Exemplary (or Punitive) Antitrust Damages in EC Competition Cases With an International Element 
- the Rome II Regulation and the Commission's White Paper on Damages‟ (2009) 29 European Competition Law 
Review 430; Jindrich Kloub, „White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Plea for a More 
Holistic Approach‟ (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 515. 
23
 European Commission, White Paper (n 9) 3 (emphasis in original). 
24
 Lawrence J White (ed), Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning (MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 
1988) 3. Since the publication of the Georgetown data the number of private antitrust cases has dropped 
considerably. 
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about private litigation. Preparing its Green Paper, the European Commission 
authorised a study on the conditions for damages claims in case of infringement of the 
EC Competition Rules (Ashurst Study).25 The Welfare Impact Report, underpinning the 
White Paper, prepared by an international team of researchers, also presented data on 
litigation in the courts of the Member States.26 Both studies, however, focused on 
damages actions and neglected other types of antitrust remedies. Although the focus 
and methods used to compile information about case are debatable, there is some 
reason behind the Commission‟s claim. Based on evidence from these reports the 
European Commission came to the conclusion that there is a “[…] lack of an effective 
legal framework for private actions seeking compensation for the damages caused 
[…]”.27 
 
The European private antitrust policy has certainly raised the awareness of antitrust 
litigation in the Member States. However, the precise proposals are contentious. 
Collective action devises, discovery procedure or other measures intended to improve 
private enforcement are alien to many jurisdictions and, consequently, did not receive a 
very warm welcome.28 Unfortunately, most commentators do not deal with the 
assumptions on which the proposals are based. Furthermore, there has been little 
resistance against the presumption that the diversified rules in the Member States 
actually cause the (assumed) lack of private cases.29 
 
2.2 Private antitrust enforcement policy in Germany 
In this section, I will describe the current legal framework highlighting recent policy 
changes and amendments of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) related to 
                                                          
25
 Waelbroeck, Slater and Even-Shoshan (n 12). 
26
 Renda and others (n 11). Both studies the Welfare Impact Report and the Ashurst Study will be explained in more 
detail below. 
27
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document (n 11). 
28
 Ulf Böge, „Public and Private Enforcement: Harmony or Discord‟ (2006) 5 Competition Law Journal 114; Jon 
Lawrence, „Seeking the Perfect Balance: Some Reflections on the Commission's Green Paper on Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules‟ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), Enforcement of 
Prohibition of Cartels (European Competition Law Annual, Hart, Oxford 2007); Thomas Eilmansberger, „The Green 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules and Beyond: Reflections on the Utility and Feasibility 
of Stimulating Private Enforcement Through Legislative Action‟ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 431. 
29
 This point was made by Kortmann. Kortmann and Swaak (n 23) 350. 
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litigation for breaches of European or German competition law.30 I will not, however, 
address contentious issues surrounding the substantive provisions of the ARC and the 
proposals being made to solve those problems. 
 
Similar to the development of private antitrust actions on the European level, private 
enforcement of national competition law did not gain much attention until the late 20th 
century.31 It was only after the millennium that an increasing number of academics and 
practitioners started exploring this topic in-depth, for example, by comparing private 
enforcement regimes across jurisdictions or looking into the procedural or substantive 
details of private antitrust.32 When the ARC came into force in 1958, private actions 
                                                          
30
 For a brief overview of the current setup in Germany see Wolfgang Wurmnest, „A New Area for Private Antitrust 
Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law Against Restraints of Competition‟ (2005) 6 
German Law Journal 1173; Thomas Lübbig and Miriam Le Bell, „Die Reform des Zivilprozesses in Kartellsachen‟ 
(2006) Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 1209. 
31
 Hans Goll, „§ 22 GWB ein Schutzgesetz?‟ (1976) WuW 291; Hans Goll, „Verbraucherschutz im Kartellrecht‟ (1976) 
GRUR 486; Hans-Martin Müller-Laube, Der private Rechtsschutz gegen unzulässige Beschränkungen des 
Wettbewerbs und mißbräuchliche Ausübung von Marktmacht im deutschen Kartellrecht (Schriften zum 
Wirtschaftsrecht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1980); Ludwig Linder, Privatklage und Schadensersatz im Kartellrecht: 
Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zum deutschen und amerikanischen Recht. Univ. Diss.--Tübingen, 1979. 
(Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik, Nomos-Verl.-Ges. Baden-Baden 1980); Karsten Schmidt, „Offenhaltung der 
Märkte durch private Klagen bei Kartellsachverhalten? - Ein Beitrag zur Schutzgesetzdiskussion um § 35 GWB‟ in 
Clemens-August Andreae (ed), Wettbewerb als Herausforderung und Chance: Festschrift für Werner Benisch 
(Heymann, Köln 1989); Rüdiger Volhard, „Schadensersatz bei Preisabsprachen in der neueren Rechtsprechung‟ in 
Gisela Wild, Ine-Marie Schulte-Franzheim and Monika Lorenz-Wolf (eds), Festschrift für Alfred-Carl Gaedertz zum 
70. Geburtstag (Beck, München 1992); Ernst Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht (Schriftenreihe 
Europa\0308isches Recht, Politik und Wirtschaft, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1996); Rainer Traugott, „Anspruch auf 
Belieferung aus Art 85 Abs 1 EGV in Verbindung mit § 823 Abs 2 BGB und § 249 Satz 1 BGB?‟ (1997) WuW 486; 
Stephanie Haslinger, „Zum Belieferungsanspruch aufgrund Art 85 EGV iVm § 823 II, 249ff BGB‟ (1998) WuW 456. 
32
 Hempel (n 19); Rolf Hempel, „Privater Rechtsschutz im deutschen Kartellrecht nach der 7. GWB Novelle‟ (2004) 54 
WuW 362; Friedrich W Bulst, „Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung durch die Marktgegenseite - deutsche Gerichte auf 
Kollisionskurs zum EuGH‟ (2004) NJW 2201; Monopolkommission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten 
GWB-Novelle: Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB (Bonn 2004) 
http://www.monopolkommission.de/sg_41/text_s41.pdf accessed 30 May 2008; Monopolkommission (n 33); Rolf 
Hempel, „Private Follow-on Klagen im Kartellrecht‟ (2005) 55 WuW 137; Wurmnest (n 31); Frank Breitkreutz, Das 
Kartellverbot als Schutzgesetz: Ein Beitrag zum Drittschutz im Kartellrecht. Univ. Diss.--Rostock, 2004. (Rostocker 
Schriften zum Wirtschaftsrecht, Kovac, Hamburg 2005); Bundeskartellamt, Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung - Stand, 
Probleme, Perspektiven: Diskussionspapier für die Sitzung des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht am 26. September 2005 
(Bonn 2005) http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Diskussionsbeitraege/05_Proftag.pdf accessed 
26 March 2010; Georg M Berrisch and Markus Burianski, „Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche nach der 7. 
GWB-Novelle‟ (2005) WuW 878; Wulf-Henning Roth, „Das Kartelldeliktsrecht in der 7. GWB-Novelle‟ in Theodor 
Baums and others (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Huber: Zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006); 
Friedrich W Bulst, Schadensersatzansprüche der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht: Zur Schadensabwälzung nach 
deutschem, europäischem und US-amerikanischem Recht (Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, 1
st
 edn Nomos, Baden-
Baden 2006); Jürgen Keßler, „Private Enforcement - Zur deliktsrechtlichen Aktualisierung des deutschen und 
europäischen Kartellrechts im Lichte des Verbraucherschutzes‟ (2006) Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 1061; 
Christian Schwedler, Die private Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts in den USA, Europa und Deutschland 
(Schriftenreihe des Studiengangs Wirtschafts- und Umweltrecht der FH- Trier, Umwelt-Campus Birkenfeld, Bülow, 
Rothenburg 2006); Michael Meyer, „Die Bindung der Zivilgerichte an Entscheidungen im Kartellverwaltungsrechtsweg 
- der neu § 33 IV GWB auf dem Prüfstand‟ (2006) WuW 27; Günter Hirsch, „Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Law - Developments in Germany‟ (2006) 5 Competition Law Journal 108; Böge and Ost Konrad (n 14); Böge (n 29); 
Christian Göertz, Private Durchsetzung von Kartellrecht in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz 
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were assumed to be part of the overall enforcement scheme. In its original form, the 
ARC already provided an obligation of the courts to inform the competition authority 
about antitrust cases that were brought before them.33 It was thought that this rule 
would enable the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) to realise the public interest in civil 
litigation.34 However, the dominant enforcement mode was deemed to be public. Private 
enforcement moved further into the public focus with litigation being brought after the 
Vitamin decision of the European Commission,35 the Courage ruling,36 and the 
Modernisation Regulation 1/2003. With the modernisation of the application of 
European competition law it became necessary to align German competition law with 
Article 101. Delayed by one year, the 7th amendment of the ARC, put into effect on 1 
July 2005, translated European standards into national law, notably changing and 
introducing section 33 and 89a of the ARC respectively.37 The reform also contained 
rules which were hoped to clarify and improve the conditions for private antitrust 
enforcement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Rechtswissenschaftliche Forschungsberichte, Mensch & Buch Verlag, Berlin 2007); André Görner, Die 
Anspruchsberechtigung der Marktbeteiligung nach § 33 GWB. Univ. Diss.-2007--Mainz, 2006. (FIW-Schriftenreihe, 
Heymann, Köln 2007); Wernhard Möschel, „Behördliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?‟ 
(2007) WuW 483; Wernhard Möschel, „Should Private Enforcement of Competition Law Be Strengthened?‟ in Dieter 
Schmidtchen, Max Albert and Stefan Voigt (eds), The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law 
(Conferences on new political economy, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007); Florian Endter, Schadensersatz nach 
Kartellverstoß: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung der Anspruchsgrundlagen im europäischen, deutschen und 
englischen Recht (Münchner Schriften zum Europäischen und Internationalen Kartellrecht, Stämpfli, Bern 2007); 
George Cumming, Brad Spitz and Ruth Janal, Civil Procedure Used for Enforcement of EC Competition Law by the 
English, French and German Civil Courts (International competition law series, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan 
den Rijn 2007); Lysann Beu, Private Enforcement: Die Stellung der Verbraucher bei der Durchsetzung von 
Schadensersatz- und Unterlassungsansprüchen im deutschen Kartellrecht (1
st
 edn VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 
Saarbrücken 2007); Christina Kaufmann, Rechtsschutz im deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht: Konzeption 
einer effektiven Schadensersatzklage (VDM Müller, Saarbrücken 2007); Moritz Votteler, Der 
Schadensersatzanspruch im EG-Kartellrecht: Existenz und Ausgestaltung. Univ. Diss.--Passau, 2008. (Studienreihe 
Wirtschaftsrechtliche Forschungsergebnisse, Kovac, Hamburg 2008); Hans P Logemann, Der kartellrechtliche 
Schadensersatz: Die zivilrechtliche Haftung bei Verstößen gegen das deutsche und europäische Kartellrecht nach 
Ergehen der VO (EG) Nr. 1/2003 und der 7. GWB-Novelle. Univ. Diss.--Bonn, 2008. (Beiträge zum europäischen 
Wirtschaftsrecht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2009); Alexander Kruß, Kartellschaden und Verbraucherschutz: 
Rechtliche und faktische Rechtsdurchsetzungshürden für die Kompensation kartellbedingter Streuschäden unter 
Berücksichtigung gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Vorgaben. Univ. Diss.--Trier, 2009. (Studienreihe Wirtschaftsrechtliche 
Forschungsergebnisse, Kovac, Hamburg 2010); Christian Alexander, Schadensersatz und Abschöpfung im 
Lauterkeits- und Kartellrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2010). 
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35
 Vitamins (2001) 4 OJ. 
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 Courage Limited v Bernard Crehan (n 6). 
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Section 1 ARC prohibits horizontal and vertical agreements similarly to Article 101. 
Section 2 ARC corresponds with Article 101(3). Some agreements of medium-sized 
firms are excluded from the prohibition in section 1 if they meet the conditions laid out in 
section 3 ARC. Prior to the 7th amendment of the ARC, vertical agreements were not 
included in the prohibition of section 1 ARC. Until then only vertical agreements binding 
prices and terms were per se prohibited.38 Before 2005 exclusive dealing agreements 
and other vertical distribution agreements were only controlled in respect of abuse and 
there was little room for private enforcement.39 With respect to unilateral conduct 
German law still differs from the European law as the 7th amendment of the ARC made 
use of Article 3 of the Modernisation Regulation. This provision granted the Member 
States the right to maintain stricter rules for the abuse of market power. The control of 
unilateral conduct in the ARC is based on three pillars: section 19 ARC prohibits the 
abuse of dominance, section 20 ARC restricts the discrimination and hindrance by 
dominant firms and undertakings with relative market strength, and section 21 ARC 
bans other undue business conduct such as boycotts. While section 19 ARC prohibits 
the abuse of dominance similarly to Article 102, section 20 disqualifies the abuse of 
relative market strength and incorporates a significant difference to European law. 
According to section 20(1) ARC, dominant undertakings or associations of undertakings 
shall not directly or indirectly discriminate or hinder other undertakings without 
justification. Paragraph 2 of this provision extends the prohibition including non-
dominant undertakings (or associations of undertakings) if small or medium-sized firms 
depend on them as suppliers or purchasers (economic dependency). A small or 
medium-sized undertaking is dependent if it cannot reasonably switch to other suppliers 
or purchasers, or switching is not sufficiently possible. The concept of relative market 
power does not only apply to vertical relationships but is also extended to undertakings 
that have superior market power in relation to their small and medium-sized 
competitors. According to paragraph 4 of section 20, undertakings with superior market 
power compared with small and medium-sized competitors shall not hinder or obstruct 
their rivals in an unjust way, for example, by pricing below cost. Not only the (missing) 
                                                          
38
 Section 14 ARC old. 
39
 Möschel (n 33) 103. 
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prerequisite of dominance distinguishes section 19 and 20 ARC. The wording of section 
19 and 20 ARC differs as well: the former refers to an abuse of dominance while the 
latter mentions discrimination and hindrance. However, the meaning remains roughly 
the same. It is claimed that, in practice, section 20 ARC only becomes relevant if the 
dominance criterion required in section 19 ARC is not met.40 Otherwise, sections 19(1), 
20(1) and (4) ARC overlap with regard to the type of conduct concerned.41 Section 20(6) 
addresses the conduct of professional and business associations which shall not refuse 
to accept applications for membership if the refusal would amount to an unjustified 
discrimination and lead to an unfair disadvantage of the undertaking concerned. Finally, 
section 21 ARC disqualifies other anticompetitive conduct and bans boycotts; that are 
requests made to third parties to refuse to deal or supply another firm. It also bans firms 
under scrutiny from harming another undertaking because the latter complained to the 
competition authority.  
 
Prior to the 7th amendment of the ARC, private enforcement of the competition rules 
was based on both section 33 ARC42 and section 823(2) of the German Civil Code. If 
plaintiffs alleged a breach of European law and requested damages, the claim had to be 
based on section 823(2) Civil Code (for the breach of a statute) in conjunction with 
Articles 101 and 102. For a violation of German competition law, plaintiffs could refer to 
section 33 ARC asking for injunctions or damages. Under both provisions plaintiffs had 
standing if they fell within the scope of protection of either Articles 101 and 102 or 
German competition law. The courts interpreted the scope of protection requirement 
narrowly and granted standing only if the violation was specifically directed at the 
plaintiff.43 This led to a number of judgements, especially follow-on damages actions in 
the aftermath of the European Commission‟s Vitamin decision, in which purchasers 
                                                          
40
 Kurt Markert, „20‟ in Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds), GWB: Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Kartellrecht (Wettbewerbsrecht / Immenga Mestmäcker, 4
th
 edn Beck, München 2007) para 1. 
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 ibid. para 239. 
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 Section 33 ARC of the ARC 1999 (annulled) (translation by the author): Whoever violates a provision of this Act or 
a decision of the competition authority is, if the provision or decision aims at the protection of an individual, obliged to 
cease and desist and, if he acts intentionally or negligently, he is also obliged to compensate the damage the 
occurred due to the violation. The request to cease and desist can also be brought forward by associations with legal 
capacity that promote business interest. 
43
 BGHZ 86, 324 Familienzeitschrift. 
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were denied standing and, thus, compensation for overcharges.44 With the 
modernisation of German antitrust law, all private damages actions are now based on 
section 33(3) ARC granting a right to compensation when European or German 
competition law were violated.45 At the same time, the legislator abolished the protective 
law requirement. The new standing test limits the number of plaintiffs to “affected 
parties” for both injunctions and removal requests in accordance with section 33(1) 
ARC. The “affected parties” restriction also applies to damages remedies provided for in 
section 33(3) ARC. Affected parties can be both competitors and other market 
participants depending on the type of infringement. It is contentious whether or not 
indirect purchasers have standing under the new test.46 
 
                                                          
44
 Landgericht Mainz, NJW-RR 2004, 478 Vitaminkartell; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe NJW 2004, 2243 
Vitaminkartell; Landgericht Mannheim GRUR 2004, 182 Vitaminkartell. 
45
 Section 33 ARC after the 7
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Code of Civil Procedure [Zivilprozessordnung] may take into account, in particular, the proportion of the profit which 
the undertaking has derived from the infringement. From the occurrence of the damage, the undertaking shall pay 
interest on its obligations to pay money pursuant to sentence 1. §§ 288 and 289 sentence 1 of the Civil Code shall 
apply mutatis mutandis. 
(4) Where damages are claimed for an infringement of a provision of this Act or of Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty, 
the court shall be bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred, to the extent such a finding 
was made in a final decision by the cartel authority, the Commission of the European Community, or the competition 
authority - or court acting as such - in another Member State of the European Community. The same applies to such 
findings in final judgements resulting from appeals against decisions pursuant to sentence 1. Pursuant to Article 
16(1), sentence 4 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 this obligation applies without prejudice to the rights and obligations 
under Article 234 of the EC Treaty. 
(5) The limitation period of a claim for damages pursuant to paragraph 3 shall be suspended if proceedings are 
initiated by the cartel authority for infringement within the meaning of paragraph 1, or by the Commission of the 
European Community or the competition authority of another Member State of the European Community for 
infringement of Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty. § 204(2) of the Civil Code shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
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 Eckard Rehbinder, § 33 para 14 in Ulrich Loewenheim, Karl M Meessen and Alexander Riesenkampff (eds), 
Kartellrecht: Kommentar (Beck, München 2009); Volker Emmerich, § 33 para 29 in Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-
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Mestmäcker, 4
th
 edn Beck, München 2007). 
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Under general civil law rule the damages comprise of the suffered loss including 
foregone profits. Difficulties of damages calculations are eased under section 287 of the 
Civil Procedure Code. It provides for an estimation of the damages if the exact 
calculation is too difficult or the costs are disproportionate compared to the claimed 
losses. The passing-on defence is not totally excluded in Germany although it appears 
that it is rather unlikely to succeed in court. In principle, indirect purchasers who seek 
damages are not barred from legal actions against the violator. Section 33(3) does not 
exclude a claim for damages just because the affected good has been sold by the 
plaintiff. The meaning of this sentence is not entirely clear but indicates that the 
defendant cannot refer to the passing-on defence in case the overcharged product was 
sold.47 
 
As for injunctions, section 33(1) of the ARC states that if a provision of the ARC is 
infringed and the violation found to be illegal, the infringer has to remediate the affected 
person. If a risk of a recurrent infringements exists, which is normally presumed, an 
injunction will be granted requiring the defendant to undertake or to refrain from 
undertaking certain actions. According to sections 935f of the Civil Procedure Rules, 
plaintiffs can also ask for an injunction by way of interim relief. Interim relief is a 
preliminary and speedy remedy that, in theory, precludes a decision on the merits. For 
instance, the continuation of a delivery can temporarily be enforced by way of interim 
relief.48 The 7th amendment did not change the right of parties to infer the nullity of an 
agreement that violates competition law. A contract which infringes Article 101 is void 
according to Article 101(2). Other breaches of European or national competition law 
may also lead to nullity if the claimant refers to section 134 of the German Civil Code. 
Section 134 states that a legal transaction infringing a statutory prohibition is void 
unless the violated statute leads to a different conclusion. Pleading the voidness of a 
contract, plaintiffs can make an unjust enrichment claim in order to reverse the 
                                                          
47
 Joachim Bornkamm, § 33 in Christian Bahr, Eugen Langen and Hermann-Josef Bunte (eds), Deutsches 
Kartellrecht (Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht, 10. Aufl. / Luchterhand, München 2006); 
Lübbig and Le Bell (n 31); Christian Kersting, „Perspektiven der privaten Rechtsdurchsetzung im Kartellrecht‟ (2008) 
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 14 
 
(monetary) transfer that was based on the void contract. Unjust enrichment claims are 
brought in accordance with section 812 of the German Civil Code. If a person obtains 
something as the result of the performance of another person without legal grounds, the 
payment or value of the performance has to be returned. Usually, a contract between 
the plaintiff and the defendant provides the legal ground for a financial transfer. The 
party asking for repayment in a competition law context inherently postulates that the 
legal ground for the transaction is null and void due to an antitrust violation.  
 
Class actions in which a representative requests a remedy on behalf of an anonymous 
group of individuals do not exist in Germany. Victims of anticompetitive conduct can 
consolidate their actions if the same subject matter is concerned (joinder of parties).49 
Professional organisations can file an action on behalf of the group(s) they represent 
although the remedies are limited to injunctions (section 33(1)(2)) and disgorgement 
(section 34a).50 As for the latter claim, profits that have been skimmed off by 
professional organisation must be passed-on to the federal budget less the enforcement 
costs incurred. It is understandable that disgorgement claims have not been a success 
story as they do not provide sufficient incentives to bear the risk of litigation. The ARC 
does not know consumer class actions or representative actions brought by consumer 
organisations. The Belgian company Cartel Damages Claims („CDC‟) developed of new 
model of amassing individual claims whereby victims of cartels cede their rights to CDC 
which then brings an action for damages based on the accumulated claims.51 With the 
first case against members of the German cement cartel still pending, the courts have 
approved the admissibility of this action.52 
 
Generally, private actions must be filed before the appropriate regional court 
(leapfrogging the district court level), the second tier in the hierarchy of German 
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courts.53 Appeals are made before the higher regional courts and appeals on questions 
of law go to the Federal Court of Justice, the highest ordinary court. Because the law 
provides special jurisdiction, parties cannot diverge and agree to negotiate their dispute 
in other ordinary courts. The modernisation of the European and German antitrust law 
also brought some procedural changes. New rules on evidence, prejudgement interests, 
limitation periods and court fees favour antitrust plaintiffs. Section 33(4) ARC introduced 
a binding effect of final decisions of the European Commission, German and other 
European competition authorities in order to facilitate follow-on actions.54 Under section 
33(4) ARC plaintiffs can recover the interest from the time the damage occurred. 
According to paragraph 5 of section 33 ARC limitation periods stop running if public 
proceedings are initiated. The new section 89a ARC allows the court to adjust the value 
of the antitrust dispute on the request of one of the parties. Thus, the court fee may be 
accustomed to the party‟s economic situation. The German system does not know 
extensive discovery but applies flexible rules for the burden of proof. For instance, the 
burden of proof for an abuse of market power can be reversed under section 20(5) ARC 
if it appears on the basis of specific facts or general experience that market power was 
abused. If the burden of proof is reversed, it is the defendant who has to show that he 
did not engage in an illegal activity. However, section 20(5) only applies to cases in 
which undertakings with superior market power in relation to their competitors engage in 
an abuse. But the courts have also used common civil procedure to reverse the burden 
of proof.55 Under certain conditions and if the facts or circumstances to be proven are in 
the domain of the defendant, the court may decide that the defendant has to 
substantially disprove the plaintiff‟s claim.56 
 
2.3 The status of private antitrust enforcement 
In this section, I will briefly outline the major empirical studies on private antitrust 
enforcement in Europe in order to show what is known about private antitrust. Although 
the legal framework and the legal issues have been subject to detailed scrutiny and 
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extensive debate we know very little about the existence and shape of private actions in 
Europe. On both the European and German level various claims have been made about 
the extent and nature of actions for the breach of EU and national competition law. 
Since most of our knowledge about private actions stems from research that has been 
undertaken in the United States, I will glance over the Atlantic.57 The famous US 
Georgetown Project, but also more recent work, have considerably advanced the 
knowledge about private antitrust litigation. However, one should bear in mind that the 
US framework is very special58 and not all of the insights can be directly transferred to 
European jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it provides a useful starting point for the analysis 
of antitrust litigation. I will also look at data from the UK and two studies covering a 
number of Member States. 
 
Lin, Raj, Sandfort and Slottje provide for an overview of private and government cases 
in the United States from as early as 1942 until 1995. While there were less than a 100 
public cases per year in the early days of US antitrust, private litigation exceeded the 
100 mark in 1949 and surmounted the figure of 1,000 in 1971.59 The number of private 
proceedings seems to have fallen again towards the end of the observation period. In a 
paper published in 1970, Richard A. Posner presented his results of an investigation of 
civil and public enforcement of the Sherman Act from 1890 until 1960.60 His paper 
looked at the number of cases filed, the length of proceedings, the record of success of 
antitrust claimants, the use of various civil and criminal remedies, the pattern of 
violations alleged, the industries involved, the possible explanative role of politics, and 
measure by which antitrust statistics could be improved. His work shows that private 
antitrust enforcement really started in the 1940s. The success rate of private cases 
litigated especially before the Supreme Court is relatively high hardly falling below 50 
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per cent for the various time periods in his study. Allegations of price fixing, price 
discrimination and boycotts are often the basis of private litigation. 
 
The ground-breaking Georgetown Project still provides one of the major sources of 
knowledge about private antitrust enforcement although the study was conducted in the 
heyday of US private antitrust. Since then the courts have made it more difficult to bring 
private actions. The authors of the Project analysed almost 2,000 law suits from five 
federal districts which were brought between 1973 and 1983 and provided the basis for 
a number of influential papers.61 The study focused, among others, on the business 
relationship of plaintiffs and defendants, the outcome of the cases, the length of trial, the 
alleged statutory violations, remedies, costs, and industries. Assessing the Georgetown 
data, Elzinga and Wood pointed out that the typical antitrust case needs more 
resources than a civil law procedure.62 They also argued that private enforcement 
contributes less to economic efficiency and that public enforcement might be superior in 
that respect. Perloff and Rubinfeld developed a model of settlements and stressed the 
influence of the damages multiplier on the likelihood of settlements.63 Kauper and 
Snyder found that no more than 25 per cent of the assessed cases followed a 
government action.64 They showed that follow-on cases deal with more serious 
infringements and lead to greater sums of recovery. Kauper and Snyder proved that 
stand-alone claims do not take longer than follow-on actions nor were they less 
successfully litigated. However, settlement rates were higher for cases that succeed a 
government decision. Overall, the study revealed that 90 per cent of all US antitrust 
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enforcement between 1973 and 1983 was based on civil actions brought by those who 
allegedly suffered a loss from the breach of the antitrust rules.65 
 
Lande and Davis assessed 40 antitrust cases in a more recent study.66 The aim of their 
project was to show the financial benefits of private antitrust enforcement. The data did 
not include cases that were concluded before 1990 or produced a cash value of less 
than $50 million. The authors also excluded proceedings which, for instance, were lost, 
appeared to be difficult or time-consuming, or in which the precise monetary value of 
the case could not be specified. Lande and Davis stressed that the deterrent effect of 
private enforcement is significantly higher than the deterrent effect of criminal 
enforcement of the Department of Justice.  
 
While a considerable amount of information about US private antitrust enforcement is 
available, few data has been gathered and assessed in Europe. A comprehensive and 
systematic study of private enforcement of competition law was conducted by Barry 
Rodger who analysed civil litigation in the UK until 2008.67 His research was based on 
the two main legal databases from which he extracted detailed information about 
statutory provisions, anticompetitive behaviour, parties, and outcome in cases in which 
an infringement of European and UK competition law was claimed before UK courts. He 
observed that in recent years the number of competition law issues that were brought 
by plaintiffs increased compared to cases in which a competition law defences was 
raised. Rodger believes that “[…] the absence of developed procedural and substantive 
rules appears to be both a cause and effect of settlement practice, and is arguably 
restricting, discouraging and disincentivising appropriate competition law claims."68 
Empirical research on antitrust settlements in the UK, which was also undertaken by 
Rodger, suggests that allegations of abusive conduct play an important role in private 
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competition law cases. According to Rodger, the majority of competition law disputes in 
the UK were settled out of court before a final judgement on the merits was made.69 
 
The lack of knowledge about the real extent and nature of private antitrust enforcement 
becomes obvious if one looks at other European (civil law) jurisdictions for which no 
comprehensive and systematic studies exist to date barring anecdotal evidence.70 Even 
the two major studies commissioned by the European Commission do not shed much 
light on the nature of private enforcement of the national and EU competition rules. The 
Ashurst Study,71 instructed by the Commission in 2004, was carried out in order to 
identify the obstacles to successful damages actions for the infringement of EU 
competition law. Primarily comparing the conditions for compensatory antitrust claims in 
25 Member States, the authors also collected information about the volume of antitrust 
litigation. The study revealed around 60 judged damages cases for damages actions of 
which 12 were decided on the basis of EU law, around 32 on the basis of national law 
and six cases dealt with both EU and national law. 28 judgements had resulted in an 
award being made at the time of the study. As for Germany, Ashurst singled out 159 
competition law proceedings (all remedies) between 1999 and 2004 of which 119 led to 
a court decision. 27 per cent of those 119 German cases were awarded and 45 per cent 
dismissed on the merits. The remaining cases were interim proceedings and cases with 
an unknown outcome. Interestingly, 93 (80 per cent) of the 119 cases were exclusively 
based on alleged violations of German competition law.72 Although the authors of the 
Ashurst Report warned of the limited explanatory power of their study, this warning has 
been mostly ignored in subsequent debates.73 The empirical research undertaken by 
Ashurst with respect to private antitrust cases was probably the first of its kind in 
Europe. However, Ashurt‟s empirical work suffered from two drawbacks. First, for their 
final comparative report the authors considered only damages actions which were 
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 20 
 
based on the violation of EU competition law ignoring all instances in which cases for 
the violation of national antitrust law were brought or other than damages remedies 
were requested. Second, gathering information about antitrust cases in Germany, the 
national rapporteurs asked courts whether they know about competition law litigation in 
their jurisdictions. This approach assumed the existence of sufficient resources to reply 
and relied on the willingness to respond which was low.74 Of the 42 courts approached, 
eight did not reply at all. Only six courts and the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 
answered the survey thoroughly. The method also implied that the courts were actually 
aware of competition law claims and classified them accordingly. With the focus on 
damages actions for the violation of Articles 101 and 102 the study concluded that the 
number of successful claims was low. 
 
More recent real-world data was provided by the Welfare Impact Report of 2008, 
underpinning the European Commission‟s White Paper from the same year.75 Relying 
on the Commission‟s data collation and reports from the Member States, the Impact 
Report identified 96 antitrust damages actions in the EU27. The Impact Report did not 
include litigation solely based on the violation of national competition laws. It states that 
there has been a growth in the number of private antitrust cases per year since the 
Ashurst Study was published. However, no successful EU law damages action was 
reported. Follow-on actions, which had been initiated after an authority handed down a 
decision, clearly dominanted according to the Impact Report. Sarra and Marra used a 
different source for their analysis of obstacles to private enforcement relying on suits 
that were reported to the e-competition database.76 They found that of the 36 
proceedings they identified in the Member States many antitrust cases are brought on 
the back of previous courts' judgements or authorities' decisions. In their view, actions 
for damages are often rejected or dismissed for the lack of evidence.77 
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Subsequent to the publication of the Ashurst Report, the German Federal Cartel Office 
(FCO) published German litigation data on two occasions challenging the dominant 
notion of underdevelopment. In its discussion paper on private enforcement of 
competition law the FCO stated that the courts register several hundreds proceedings 
each year.78 For the time period between 2002 and 2005 the FCO counted around 900 
civil cases. Explaining the year 2004 in more detail, the FCO found 240 civil disputes. 
56 of these proceedings were decided under German competition law with 20 cases 
won and 36 lost. The violation of European law was brought forward in 12 proceedings 
with three cases won and nine lost. Damages were considered in 38 judgements and 
awarded in 19 proceedings. The 2004 data showed that plaintiffs mainly alleged vertical 
restraints and unilateral conduct while actions against hard-core cartels were rarely 
brought. The FCO concluded that private antitrust enforcement is an integral part of 
enforcement in Germany.79 A similar claim was made by the then president of the FCO 
who stressed that private antitrust enforcement does play a role in the German setting.80 
In his view, most private enforcement cases in Germany do not involve hard-core 
cartels. Private litigation complements public enforcement as the competition authorities 
would be overburdened if they had to take up each case of, for instance, unjustified 
refusal to supply.81 
 
2.4 Preliminary conclusion 
In the last decade, decision makers in Europe and the Member States discovered the 
importance of private antitrust enforcement. The late discovery was followed by intense 
action to improve the conditions for antitrust damages actions. It is probably correct to 
assume that a glance at the US developments has sparked and shaped the legislative 
proposals of the European Commission. However, the proposals may have overlooked 
the particular setup in the Member States. As for its main assumption of 
underdevelopment, the reform could stand on rather shaky ground. All proposals and 
most of the discussion are based on the assumption that private antitrust enforcement 
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in general, and private damages actions for the breach of EU competition law in 
particular are completely underdeveloped. This assumption lacks systematic evidence 
for most Member States though. Little is known about the real number of cases, the 
nature of private actions, the origin thereof or the competition law provisions involved. 
The often made comparison with the US probably obfuscated the fact that the 
procedural systems on both sides of the pond differ significantly from each other. 
Furthermore, while the nature (mostly damages actions) and the number of claims in 
the US is relatively well known, the state of private actions in Europe is unknown for 
most parts. We do not know how many cases involving both national and European law 
exist, which remedies they deal with (are they mostly damages claims?) and in which 
context antitrust issues are raised. While commentators in the US agree that private 
antitrust litigation is a major component of the overall enforcement scheme, there is less 
consensus about the role of private actions in Europe. The majority of stakeholders 
focuses on damages actions and concludes from a lack thereof that private 
enforcement is underdeveloped in the European Union.82 
 
Not only on EU level, but also in Germany, it is frequently asserted that private antitrust 
is underdeveloped.83 Without reference to empirical evidence, private antitrust 
enforcement is said to be of no significance. At the same time, the Federal Cartel Office 
asserts that private parties do enforce competition law and that those activities 
supplement public enforcement.84 It is probably fair to assume that the actual state and 
volume of private enforcement in Europe and in Germany is contentious and, to a 
certain extent, simply unknown. Only in the UK has a systematic and comprehensive 
study illuminating the volume of private competition law cases been undertaken so far. 
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3. The study – design, data collection and limitations 
 
The previous section showed that we know relatively little about the nature and 
magnitude of private actions in Germany and Europe. In this section I will outline the 
study‟s objective, the design and the information used to compile the dataset on 
German private antitrust. As with all empirical work there are some limitations which I 
will explain too. 
 
The major aim of this study was to find out how many and what type of private antitrust 
actions are brought before German courts. The wide-ranging statements about the 
amount of litigation ranging from “underdeveloped” to “being an important part of the 
enforcement scheme” motivated this research. Unlike the studies that were conducted 
at the European level, this project was not confined to damages actions for the breach 
of EU competition law. It follows a wider approach because the law provides more than 
just damages claims to remedy the violation of competition law. The data includes the 
alleged breaches of both European and German competition law. Going beyond the 
mere volume of proceedings, I included inter alia the following questions: which antitrust 
breaches are predominantly privately pursued? Do private actions follow public 
decisions or are they mostly brought independently? What types of plaintiff – 
competitors, direct customers or consumers – are most likely to bring actions? In which 
industries do private actions occur more frequently? 
 
At the outset, I sought information about the courts, the date of the decision and 
whether the claim was brought independently or followed by a public investigation. The 
primarily and secondarily sought remedies were looked for as well as the outcome of 
litigation. Further variables covered counterclaims, the amount of damages, the 
primarily and secondarily violated statutory provisions, the primarily and secondarily 
alleged anticompetitive behaviour, the business relationship between the parties, the 
market shares of the parties or, in the absence of market share data, a rough estimation 
of the plaintiff‟s size. Plaintiffs can bring forward more than one remedy request based 
on various allegations of breaches of the antitrust rules. Referring to the primarily and 
 24 
 
secondarily remedy, statute or antitrust violation respectively, I tried to collect 
information about cases in which multiple requests or multiple allegations were made. 
Primarily and secondarily refers to the order of remedy requests or allegations. 
Furthermore, I tried to learn more about the affected industry and whether the case was 
decided by an appeal court. Unfortunately, information about the size of the parties, 
market shares or the size of damages awarded proved untraceable or so patchy that I 
decided not to include the data in my analysis. As for the size of the damages award 
anecdotal evidence exists for some proceedings. 
 
The initial data for this study stemmed from the FCO. The FCO holds basic information 
about private antitrust proceedings which are conveyed by the courts. According to 
section 90(1) ARC courts are obliged to notify cases to the FCO in which a dispute 
arises out of the application of either European or German antitrust law.85 The FCO‟s 
data are the most but not entirely complete compilation of German antitrust litigation. A 
central database or register from which one could extract information about actual or 
past cases does not exist. Judges are not bound to publicise their decisions and it is 
normally in their discretion to communicate rulings which they deem to be of public 
interest. Consequently, even commercial databases are by no means complete. This 
reporting deficit does not create difficulties with respect to larger or contentious antitrust 
cases as they are most likely to be publicised but it seriously affects ordinary disputes 
because of the lack of public interest. To a certain extent, the notification duty in section 
90(1) ARC helps to overcome this problem. However, notwithstanding the notification 
duty some proceedings are not notified or only after the judgement was made. There 
are also instances in which the notification reports are delayed and have to be chased 
down by staff of the FCO. 
 
The access to the FCO‟s data was limited for confidentiality reasons. Anonymised lists 
of decisions – not cases – provided the basis for my dataset. In the decision lists 
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parties‟ names and other classified information was blacked out. The lists contained 
fewer details than the FCO‟s electronic „case information system‟. The printouts only 
summarised court decisions including information about the court, decision date, record 
number, and a very basic description of the case. No data was available other than for 
law suits terminated by decision due to the nature of the decision lists.86 This affects 
cases that were settled or in which the claim was not admitted in the first place. 
Furthermore, pre-trial settlements do not appear before the courts and settlements 
made during trial are not normally publicised because the judge is discharged from the 
duty to write a decision and the agreements usually contain a confidentially clause. 
Therefore, the following analysis is restricted to concluded cases. 
 
The manual data collection took place at the FCO‟s seat in Bonn in October 2008.87 The 
gathered information covers the years 2005 to 2007. Especially the manual data input 
significantly slowed down the collection process. The initially compiled data contained 
many missing values and required a review of more than half of the data points with 
information from publicly available legal databases, namely juris,88 beck-online,89 and 
court databases of some federal states.90 The verification process revealed another 57 
decisions indicating that the FCO‟s decision lists were not complete.91 It is likely that 
there are still undiscovered proceedings due to unreported or unpublicised cases and 
information bottlenecks at the courts. 
 
Having verified numerous data points with the available case law, the database was 
subsequently adjusted excluding all decisions that were made prior to 2005 and after 
2007. Cases that were clearly no private antitrust litigation were eliminated, too. For the 
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purpose of this study private enforcement refers to individually initiated litigation, either 
as stand-alone or follow-on action, before a court to remedy an infringement of antitrust 
law.92 If successful, the legal action leads to some sort of civil sanction such as 
damages, restitution, injunction, nullity or interim relief.93 Individual efforts to support 
administrative proceedings against a violator of competition law are not aimed at a civil 
sanction and, therefore, not an element of private enforcement of competition law.94 All 
civil law cases in which a competition law issue was raised either on part of the 
defendant or on part of the claimant were regarded as private antitrust case. Initially, 
that included even those cases in which competition law was not explicitly mentioned in 
the judge‟s reasoning. Complaints and appeals against public decisions of the FCO that 
are exclusively handled before the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (complaint 
instance) and the Federal Court of Justice (appeal instance) were excluded.95 Although 
both courts are civil law courts, the complaints are not ordinary civil law claims or private 
enforcement cases. The complaints aim at the annulment of an authority‟s decision 
(administrative act) and are not directed at a private remedy. Public procurement cases, 
being dealt with in sections 97 f ARC, were excluded as well as unfair competition law 
litigation. The latter is regulated in the Act Against Unfair Competition and was easy to 
separate from actions dealing with EU and German antitrust law. The study ignored 
state aid litigation which generally falls within the scope of the Act Against Unfair 
Competition.96 
 
4. Results of the study 
 
This section presents the results from my study. Subsection one explains the number of 
cases found and their distribution over time. Part II discusses follow-on and stand-alone 
claims. Characteristics of the parties like, for instance, their business relationship and 
                                                          
92
 Karen Yeung, „Privatizing Competition Regulation‟ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 581, 583. 
93
 Assimakis P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement - Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by 
National  Courts (Hart, Oxford 2008) 1. 
94
 ibid. 583. 
95
 The record numbers indicate whether the case is a complaint or civil antitrust litigation. 
96
State aid cases were provisionally defined as “[…] action[s] by a (national, regional or local) public authority, using 
public resources, to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods […]”. 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/state_aid_en.htm (last accessed on 10 March 2009). 
 27 
 
industry are dealt with in part III. Part IV offers information about the remedies and the 
use of competition law as offensive “sword” or defensive “shield” litigation. Following the 
description of the remedies, I will outline the outcome of the claims in part V. Plaintiffs‟ 
allegation of anticompetitive conduct and breached statutory provisions are presented in 
subsections VI and VII. Finally, subsection VIII provides an approximation for the 
lengths of the different types of private antitrust proceedings. 
 
4.1 Number of cases 
The initial search and subsequent data cleansing revealed 368 private antitrust cases 
dealt with before German courts from 2005 to 2007. Presumably, this number is an 
understatement and must be interpreted with caution. 368 proceedings are likely to be 
the lowest bound for private antitrust litigation based on the most conservative 
assessment of the decisions provided by the FCO. We can assume that the actual 
number of cases is significantly higher for two reasons. First, this dataset does not 
contain cases that were finished with other than a judgement on the merits. Especially 
settlements, dropped or dismissed claims are very likely to increase the number of 
cases if we had information about them.97 Second, for several cases the competition 
law issue in question could not be determined and those proceedings were left out of 
the analysis. In some cases I could not obtain an electronic copy of the judgement in 
order to clarify the competition issues. Other verdicts did not reveal the alleged 
competition law violation in the reasoning although it had probably been brought forward 
in the first place. Given that the special jurisdiction of regional courts and, thus, the 
notification duty is already triggered by claimants alleging an antitrust issue, we only 
know that a competition law problem was raised at some point during the proceedings.98 
In those cases I assumed that an antitrust allegation had been initially pleaded but was 
dropped at a later point or turned out to be no longer important for the judge‟s decision. 
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Only the court records could tell us more about the pleadings of the parties. However, 
there is no access to confidential court files including parties‟ statements which would 
provide more details. In cases where no or very little additional information could be 
extracted from other sources, I excluded the decision from further analysis. For this 
reason, 368 cases mark the absolutely lowest bound while further research already 
undertaken indicates that the number of cases oscillates roughly between 150 and 250 
per year. 
 
The complete dataset is based on information from the highest court decision in each 
case. If, for instance, the parties did not appeal a first-instance judgement, this decision 
determined the outcome of the case for the purpose of this study. Likewise, if a first-
instance ruling was appealed, the information from the appeal judgement was used to 
determine the nature of litigation. First instance verdicts and appeal decisions 
addressing the same parties and the same subject matter were counted as same cases 
whereby only the substantive assessment of the appeal decision was taken into 
account.99 First instance litigation refers to cases that are dealt with by the regional 
courts. All cases in which competition law is applied, even if the only question is 
whether or not competition law is applicable, are exclusively assigned to the regional 
courts,100 the second tier in the hierarchy of ordinary courts. Decisions of the regional 
courts can be appealed to the higher regional courts and, on points of law, to the 
Federal Court of Justice (BGH). I cannot exclude that some cases were reviewed after 
2007 and the decisions I present as final were later overruled or confirmed. The 
database reflects that state of all proceedings with decisions on the merit as of 31 
December 2007. 
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Table 1: Private antitrust cases per year 2005-2007 
Year Cases total First instance (% year) Appeal (% year)  Appeal to BGH* (% per year)† 
2005 147 79 (54%) 59 (40%) 9 (6%) 
2006 131 63 (48%) 60 (46%) 8 (6%) 
2007 90 38 (42%) 45 (50%) 7 (8%) 
Total 368 180 (49%) 164 (45%) 24 (7%) 
     
 
* Federal Court of Justice (BGH) is the highest appeal instance. 
† Complaints against denial of leave to appeal were not included. 
  
 
The data revealed 180 cases that ended in the first instance and 188 cases which were 
concluded at the appeal stage including 24 proceedings before the Federal Court of 
Justice (BGH), the highest ordinary court. It appears that parties, once they decide to 
litigate, regularly appeal first instance rulings. However, the numbers in Table 1 may 
exaggerate the ratio of first instance rulings and appealed cases. Cases that ended with 
a regional court verdict are less likely to be publicised than cases from higher regional 
courts. It is more probable to learn about a case if it reaches the appeal stage. Higher 
regional courts seem to notify more reliably than regional courts. Sometimes higher 
courts report more cases than lower courts in their respective district which does not 
make sense as all cases start at regional court level. There were cases in which the 
FCO appeared to be informed about ongoing antitrust litigation when parties entered the 
appeal stage. In those cases only proceedings subject to review would appear in the 
FCO‟s list of decisions. This may have distorted the ratio of first instance and appeal 
proceedings. With regards to appeals, it is interesting to note that since 2002 higher 
regional courts must explicitly grant leave to appeal their decisions on questions of law 
before the Federal Court of Justice.  Appeal must be granted if the matter is of principal 
importance, it is required for the development of the law or to safeguard the consistency 
of the case law.101 Parties can file a complaint if the leave to appeal has been denied. 
The reporting of those complaints – which are not included as they are not decisions on 
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the merits – is very fragmented. Only some complaint decisions appear in public 
domain, especially if they are successful and raise an important question of law. 
 
Table 1 indicates a drop of cases in 2007 although the date of the decision is a rather 
poor proxy for measuring the distribution of proceedings over time. It would be more 
precise to use the date on which the law suit was filed. The date of decision is 
influenced by the process duration which again is subject to the court‟s workload, the 
parties‟ pleadings, and the degree of factual and legal difficulties.  However, in the 
absence of precise information about the starting point, it is the only available time 
proxy. In order to obtain a picture of the case distribution all decisions were grouped 
according to the month in which they were made. Three decisions for which the exact 
date was unknown were excluded.102 Due to the relatively short observation period it is 
difficult to assess whether the number of private antitrust actions is actually shrinking or 
we only observe a reporting backlog. The latter seems to be more likely though. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
The line chart in Figure 1 indicates a trend towards less competition law litigation. 
However, if that holds true, it would mean that private enforcement came to a complete 
halt towards the end of the 2007. It is more likely that this downward swing is caused by 
a reporting backlog and the publicising problems described above. The particular 
difficulties of gathering information about regional court law suits may be a plausible 
explanation for the decline. The fraction of cases decided in first instance and those that 
went on to the appeal stage changed from 46 per cent appeal cases in 2005 to 58 per 
cent in 2007. This reflects the drop of regional court proceedings from 79 (2005) and 63 
(2006) to 38 (2007). The number of appeal procedures only decreased in 2007 (from 68 
cases in 2005 to 52 decisions in 2007). Although one cannot exclude the possibility that 
fewer cases have been initiated, it does not seem unlikely that the way in which 
decisions are communicated might have caused the observed decline.103 
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The drop of antitrust litigation is counterintuitive if we take into account the 2005 
amendment of German competition law improving the conditions for individual antitrust 
claims. Decisions of other EU national competition authorities became binding in follow-
on damages law suits and the “protective law” requirement, narrowing the standing for 
antitrust actions, was abolished.104 A decline of litigated cases is at odds with the 
plaintiff-encouraging amendments in the ARC. If we allow for an unknown number of 
settlements, which may have increased in the course of and after the reform, and an 
improved deterrence effect, the drop in litigated cases makes a little bit more sense. 
Whether and to what extent the on-going discussion about a more-economic approach 
for the assessment of anticompetitive conduct has deterred litigation cannot be said. 
One could argue that if courts require more and (more) sound economic evidence, they 
burden the plaintiff with additional costs and risks and, thus, may lessen the incentives 
to litigate.105 
 
Apart from the Federal Court of Justice all courts are state courts. The data show that 
private antitrust cases are not evenly distributed among the federal states.106 More than 
40 per cent of all cases stem from North Rhine-Westphalia, the economically strongest 
state and, coincidentally, the state where the Federal Cartel Office has its seat. Bavaria 
is second (16.3 per cent) followed by Hessen (9.8 per cent) and Baden-Württemberg 
(7.3 per cent). The data suggest that we observe something like an east-west divide 
which probably has its roots in the differing strength of state economies. A regression of 
the gross domestic product per federal state in 2005 against the number of cases in the 
observation period supports this conclusion. It indicates a positive relationship between 
economic strength and the number of cases per federal state.107 Although the results 
from the regression are statistically significant they make less sense from an economic 
point of view. An increase in the number of cases by one would require a growth of 
GDP per state of more than four billion Euros. In the absence of other more precise 
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indicators like, for instance, the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index or the firm 
size, gross domestic product per federal state provides for an approximated value. 
According to this estimation, there might be a relationship between the economic 
situation in a state and the frequency of antitrust cases. The recent biannual report of 
the German Monopoly Commission supports this argument too. Compiling data from 
2008, the report showed that 21 of the 73 biggest companies, based on domestic added 
value and with their headquarters in Germany, are located in North Rhine-
Westphalia.108 Baden-Württemberg comes second with 16 companies, Bavaria and 
Hessen share the third place with 11 companies having their seat in these states 
respectively. In states with no or few reported cases, like Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Thuringia, Brandenburg, Saxony, Schleswig Holstein and Saxony-Anhalt, no big firm 
has got its headquarter.109 However, there are states with just a handful of reported 
cases but with some of the 73 biggest firms within their boundaries. For example, the 
courts from Lower Saxony reported only eight antitrust proceedings notwithstanding the 
fact that four of the big 73 have their seat there. Similarly, two big firms have their main 
address in Rhineland-Palatinate which reported eight cases. The allocation of big firms 
may be another factor determining the allocation of antitrust cases. As the competent 
jurisdiction for a firm that is being sued is normally determined by the seat and big firms 
are more likely to be dominant or involved in legal disputes, the headquarters of big 
firms in Germany may also have influenced the distribution of antitrust cases. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
As Figure 2 points out, the 368 private antitrust cases present a significant share of the 
overall enforcement scheme compared with the enforcement activity of the FCO.110 
From 2005 to 2007 the FCO commenced a total of 438 proceedings and completed 577 
investigations regarding the cartel prohibition, the abuse of dominance and economic 
dependency.111 These numbers include, for instance, administrative procedures aimed 
at imposing fines, cease and desist orders and other remedies against abusive 
behaviour. The majority of public proceedings between 2005 and 2007 were either 
closed or not further investigated as the FCO saw no reason to act. One must note that 
the FCO usually open a file for each complaint or if it learns about a potential case. 
Between 2005 and 2007 cease and desist orders and fines added up to 22 formal 
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decisions. In 84 cases the undertakings concerned ceased the illegal behaviour. At the 
same time, 368 private antitrust proceedings were concluded. Bearing in mind that the 
assessment of the magnitude of private litigation is based on the most conservative 
criteria and does not include settlements, it seems that private antitrust actions play a 
considerable role in the German competition law enforcement scheme. 
 
Although my data shows that a considerable amount of private cases exist, we should 
be careful when drawing conclusions from the pure number of cases. Salop and White 
stated that “[…d]ata on the number of suits initiated, when viewed in isolation, are 
insufficient to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of deterrence and the extent to 
which violations are being committed.”112 Fewer actions may be the consequence of 
effective deterrence and, thus, indicate fewer breaches. Or it could point towards a low 
level of deterrence because there are insufficient incentives to bring suits. My data 
reveals a considerable number of law suits but does not tell us about the frequency of 
breaches of competition law or the incentives provided for plaintiffs. 
 
4.2 Stand-alone and follow-on litigation 
If national competition authorities or the European Commission have already 
investigated an infringement of the antitrust laws, plaintiffs have the opportunity to refer 
to the results of the public procedure. If plaintiffs follow a public decision, the case is 
regarded as a follow-on procedure. Needless to say that the follow-on option only exists 
where a government investigation has been conducted previously. Stand-alone actions 
are private law suits which are independently initiated and do not follow a public 
investigation. For the purpose of this study I refer to follow-on litigation if it pursues an 
identical allegation that was brought forward in a public case or the violation is 
substantially similar to a previous government action but extends the allegation to 
different markets, time periods or defendants.113 
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A preceding government action is said to alleviate the procedural burden that is on 
victims when they bring their own actions. The binding effect (or prima facie evidence in 
the US) that is provided for in several jurisdictions facilitates the proof of anticompetitive 
conduct and makes follow-on actions more likely to occur than stand-alone claims.114 In 
their study on US cases, Kauper and Snyder have shown that follow-on litigation 
benefits from preceding public efforts in a way that it costs fewer resources and results 
in higher awards.115 Somewhat unexpectedly, follow-on suits do not take less time than 
stand-alone actions.116 At the time of the Georgetown Project, the typical US private 
antitrust case entered the litigation stage only after a government agency has already 
convicted the defendant.117 This has certainly changed with law suits being filed as soon 
as an investigation is announced. Potential plaintiffs perceive public investigations as a 
signal that there must be substantial reasons for public action and thus merits in 
litigation.118 Although the plaintiff relies on preceding government investigation he still 
has to show that he suffered a loss and that this loss was caused by the violation of an 
antitrust statute. In contrast, stand-alone cases are deemed to be more complex and 
difficult because of the lack of easily available evidence. Bearing in mind that the 
German law provides for a binding effect of public decision, one would expect a 
considerable amount of follow-on claims in Germany. According to section 33(4) ARC 
victims benefit from infringement findings made in final decisions of the European 
Commission, European courts, Member States‟ courts and competition authorities with 
regard to damages actions. 
 
Against this background the data show a very low level of follow-on litigation. Only eight 
cases, or 2.2 per cent of the total sample, followed a prior decision of a competition 
authority. For four cases, or 1.1 per cent of total, it could not be established whether the 
plaintiffs referred to a decision of a competition authority. In three proceedings the 
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plaintiffs followed cartel-related investigations: the German Concrete cartel, the 
infamous Vitamin cartel and the Carbonless Paper cartel. The Vitamin and Carbonless 
Paper cartel proceedings were based on decisions of the European Commission.119 
Admittedly, the Vitamin decision of the European Commission attracted more follow-on 
damages claims in Germany though they fell outside the observation period because 
they were mostly concluded in 2003 and 2004.120 Interestingly, the Carbonless Paper 
litigation was initiated and concluded before the Court of First Instance (CFI) finally 
decided on the cartel members‟ annulment action in 2007. The German judge held inter 
alia that even if the defendant participated in the cartel, the plaintiff being an indirect 
purchaser did not have standing according to the (now outdated) protective law 
requirement.121 While the plaintiffs in both Vitamin and Carbonless Paper litigation 
requested damages, the plaintiffs in the Cement cartel case merely invoked the 
voidness of, what they regarded as, a cartel related contract. In the remaining follow-on 
actions plaintiffs based their claims on the abuse of dominance. In two cases the 
claimants referred to preliminary findings from an investigation of the FCO. The FCO 
had probed into allegations of abusive conduct in the telecommunication sector but 
settled the case after accepting commitments from the undertaking concerned. In three 
private proceedings the plaintiffs drew on a final FCO decisions in the postal services 
sector. 
 
In general, private antitrust enforcement in Germany is characterised by independently 
initiated litigation. This raises the question why litigants do not capitalise more on public 
enforcement activity. Admittedly, the observation period of only three years does not 
suffice to explain mid or long-term effects of the binding effect provided for in section 
33(4) ARC which came into force only in July 2005. One explanation could be that the 
binding effect only applies to damages claims which are more difficult to bring than 
injunctions, for instance, because loss and causation still have to be proven for the 
former. Therefore, damages actions cause higher costs compared to „bare‟ injunctions. 
                                                          
119
 Carbonless paper [2004] OJ L115/1 and Vitamins [2003] OJ L6/1. 
120
 Landgericht Dortmund WuW/E DE-R 1352 Vitaminkartell; Landgericht Mainz, NJW-RR 2004, 478 Vitaminkartell; 
Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe NJW 2004, 2243 Vitaminkartell; Landgericht Mannheim GRUR 2004, 182 Vitaminkartell. 
121
 Landgericht Mannheim EWiR 2007, 659. 
 38 
 
The possible deterrence effect of the protective law requirement until 2005 may also 
have influenced the willingness of potential plaintiffs to file actions in the aftermath of 
public decisions. In fact, before the 7th amendment of the ARC in 2005, the protective 
law requirement hampered damages actions, for instance, in the carbonless paper and 
vitamin litigation. Another possible reason why follow-on (damages) actions have not 
shaped private antitrust litigation yet may be the lack of final public decisions. According 
to its activity report 2005/2006,122 the FCO carried out 298 investigations in 2005 and 
2006 regarding the cartel prohibition, the abuse of dominance or the abuse of economic 
dependency. However, only very few investigations led to a final infringement decision – 
a necessary prerequisite for the binding effect in follow-on damages litigation.123 
However, there is a third reading of the low number of actually litigated follow-on 
actions. Since there was a number of cartel cases in both the EU and Germany during 
the observation period and given that these cases on the whole are easier to litigate 
because culpability has been established, we would expect a high level of settlements 
in cases where the defendant‟s position was weak, leaving the cases where the plaintiff 
misjudged the strength of the defendant‟s case to go to court.124 In other words, cases 
where the defendant knows that he is likely to lose are settled before or during trial and, 
thus, not part of this dataset.125 Litigation against defendants who think they have a 
good chance of fending off the claim is litigated and ends with a decision on the merits. 
As we know that roughly two thirds of the cases litigated were won by the defendants 
this may hint towards a follow-on settlement practice.126 
 
In general, the high proportion of stand-alone litigation argues in favour of a 
complementary role of private enforcement as it was claimed by Ulf Böge and Konrad 
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Ost.127 The findings of my study confirm that private enforcers are willing to take up 
cases which were not investigated by a competition authority. As we will see below, this 
is reflected in the type of anticompetitive behaviour alleged. 
 
4.3 Parties involved in antitrust litigation 
The business relationship of the claimants and the defendants was ascertained for the 
majority of observations. The study identified the relationship from the party‟s point of 
view who introduced the antitrust issue. For example, if the initial defendant in a civil law 
suit asserted an infringement of antitrust to fend off the primary claim, it was the 
defendant‟s relationship to the original claimant that mattered. Initially, I tried to identify 
seven different categories: competitors, dealers or suppliers, customers, franchisees, 
licensees, final customers or end users and indirect purchasers. If a vertically integrated 
or diversified undertaking was active in an upstream and downstream market, the 
subject matter of the legal dispute indicated whether this was litigation between dealer 
and purchaser or competitors. I do not have information about the number of plaintiffs 
and defendants in the respective case. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Direct customer claims dominated private antitrust enforcement in Germany between 
2005 and 2007 (Figure 3). They accounted for the vast majority of antitrust claimants 
with 212 proceedings or 57.6 per cent of all disputes. In 17.7 per cent of all cases 
competitors raised antitrust issues. Franchisees and licensees contributed relatively 
little to antitrust litigation in Germany. Interestingly, in only one procedure an end user 
alleged the breach of competition law and only one indirect purchaser claim could be 
identified – a striking contrast to the United States where consumer litigation exists in 
the shape of class actions.128 According to the Georgetown Study, the biggest groups of 
competition law plaintiffs in the US in the 1970s were competitors followed by dealers. 
Consumer actions amounted to nine per cent of all claims.129 Admittedly, my data is 
limited and this hampered the identification of consumers in Germany. But even with 
some potentially undetected consumer cases the proportion of consumer claims 
remains low. This result does not surprise. Consumers who want to initiate follow-on 
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claims face, more often than not, a number of problems. First, there is legal uncertainty 
as to the standing of indirect purchasers.130 Second, if they had direct dealings with the 
perpetrator, the overcharge they paid with their purchase may be too small as to provide 
a sufficient incentive for costly litigation. Third, if the antitrust violation took place 
somewhere upstream and consumers did not have direct dealings with the infringer, 
losses are likely to be passed-on to consumers but will be scattered on the consumer 
level causing only small individual harm. In addition, the passing-on of overcharges is 
difficult to prove in each individual case and further diminishes the incentives to sue. 
Only the aggregated consumer loss is sufficiently large as to provide enough of a 
stimulus for legal action. In the absence of a class action mechanism which would allow 
representatives to ask for damages on behalf of the whole class, it is unlikely that a 
single consumer risks considerable costs to remedy a petty individual loss.131 A mere 
binding effect of public decisions does not overcome this incentive problem. Legal 
actions pursuant to section 34a ARC that are aimed at disgorging the illegal profit do not 
seem to address the issues either. According to section 34a ARC, professional 
associations have standing to request an account of illegal profits stemming from 
anticompetitive conduct if a multitude of buyers or sellers were harmed.132 However, the 
illegal profits that are siphoned off the violator must be passed on to the government 
less expenses. Consequently, professional associations do not normally request an 
account of profits despite its existence for many years. Unlike the UK where designated 
consumer organisations have standing to sue on behalf of the victims,133 the ARC does 
not provide for consumer association claims.134  
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The available data tells us little about the size of the parties. Judges typically omit such 
information from the verdicts that are publicised because it is deemed to be confidential. 
Market shares as well as names of the parties were concealed in the lists of decisions I 
used as a basis for my study.135 For the majority of cases in the sample business 
information was not available. However, the impression prevails that litigation often 
takes place between small or medium sized companies which may be hint at the use of 
economic dependency rather than dominance in antitrust proceedings. Another focal 
point of private antitrust enforcement are actions against former incumbents who are 
likely to be dominant or nearly dominant. Whether or not economic dependency was 
used, as denoted by the firm size, also depends on the market definition and, 
consequently, on the size of the market for which I do not have information. The issue of 
economic dependency is subject to further research. 
 
For a majority of the decisions I could identify the relevant industry sector. Although it 
would have been ideal to know the industry for both the defendant and the plaintiff, the 
nature of accessible information only permitted to identify the industry for the matter in 
dispute. It means that the industry was determined for the sector in which the violation 
or the anticompetitive effect had allegedly occurred. This also helped to avoid multiple 
counts of industries for diversified or vertically integrated undertakings. Based on the 
UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2007 the study initially 
distinguished 21 categories.136 Antitrust litigation was observed in 14 sectors. 
 
Most cases were observed in the wholesale and retail trade sector which includes the 
sale and repair of motor vehicles. Admittedly, this industry was defined too broadly and 
limited the identification of litigation patterns, for example, in the car sector. The 
wholesale and retail trade sector accounts for 20.1 per cent of all cases. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a considerable part of the litigation in this area stems from or 
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was partly caused by the introduction of Regulation 1400/2002 in October 2003.137 
Regulation 1400/2002 forced or prompted car manufacturers to review and reorganise 
their distribution systems. Subsequently, manufacturers let dealer contracts expire or 
terminated contracts referring to Regulation 1400/2002. Likewise, car dealers who did 
not want to lose their contracts brought forward their reading of Regulation 1400/2002 
and a number of those disputes were taken to court. A superficial search in the 
database produced 13 cases, or 17.6 per cent of cases in the wholesale and retail 
sector, in which the plaintiffs or defendants referred to Regulation 1475/95 or 
1400/2002. 
 
Table 2: Industry in which the legal dispute took place 
 Industry Number % of total % of regulated 
Regulated 
and partly 
regulated 
industries** 
Electricity, gas, steam, air conditioning supply 47 12.8 34.8 
Information and communication 44 12.0 32.6 
Transport and storage 39 10.6 28.9 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management 
and remediation activities* 
5 1.4 3.7 
 Subtotal for regulated industries 135 36.8 100 
    % of unregulated 
Unregulated 
industries 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motor cycles 
74 20.1 44.3 
Manufacturing 26 7.1 15.6 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 21 5.7 12.6 
Administrative and support service activities 14 3.8 8.4 
Construction 11 3.0 6.6 
Accommodation and food service activities 10 2.7 6.0 
Financial and insurance activities 5 1.4 3.0 
Human health and social work activities 3 .8 1.8 
Other service activities 2 .5 1.2 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 1 .3 .6 
Subtotal for unregulated industries 167 45.4 100 
Missing value 66 17.9  
 Total 368 100.0  
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* Water industries are only sparsely regulated by the federal states. 
** Some unregulated markets appear in regulated industries due to wide sector definitions. 
  
 
Cases that were brought in regulated and partly regulated industries such as energy, 
(railway) transportation and telecommunication accounted for more than a third of all 
proceedings (36.8 per cent of total). In this study, regulated sectors also included legal 
disputes over postal services which, under the UK Standard Industrial Classification of 
Economic Activities 2007, were part of the transportation category. Typically, antitrust 
litigation in regulated or partly regulated sectors is directed against the former 
incumbent who is likely to operate networks or other essential inputs. For most 
regulated markets there is a varying degree of ex-ante oversight and ex-post antitrust 
enforcement. As for postal services, the monopoly of Deutsche Post AG has expired at 
the end of 2007. The (final) liberalisation of the postal service markets coincides with 
the end of my observation period. Consequently, litigation in this sector is unlikely to 
deal with letters but may concern other postal services. The Federal Network Agency 
(FNA) exercises ex-ante control over grid operators in the gas and electricity sector to 
ensure that operators do not abuse their local or regional monopolies. However, the 
FNA does not oversee retail prices for gas and electricity which leaves scope for an ex-
post control through private antitrust litigation and public enforcement by the FCO. The 
same division of responsibility applies to the telecommunication industry. The Deutsche 
Telekom AG still enjoys a dominant position in various telecommunication markets but 
is challenged by rivals. As for competition in the railway sector, the FNA enjoys 
supervision over railways and regulates the access to infrastructure in order to avoid 
discrimination. Regulatory oversight in the water sector falls within the domain of the 
federal states. In general, accusations of unfair pricing or discrimination by final 
customers or consumers are dealt with under competition law rules despite the 
regulation in certain sectors. 
 
Especially in regulated industries one would expect litigation from competitors as they 
are seeking access to the markets which are held by the dominant incumbents. 
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Competitors may have incentives to bring actions against discriminatory entry 
conditions or ask for access to networks and other essential inputs held by the 
incumbent. At the same time, little competition in upstream markets can lead to higher 
prices in end user markets if intermediaries can pass on raised input prices. From that 
perspective, final consumer claims against high prices appear likely although we 
observed a lack thereof. As for competitor claims, 17.7 per cent of all antitrust 
allegations were brought by rivals. However, (partly) regulated industries such as 
transport and storage (30.8 per cent competitor claims) as well as information and 
telecommunication (47.7 per cent) attracted more private enforcement proceedings 
initiated by competing firms.138 Although the information about the size of the parties is 
sparse, one could argue that the market entrants utilise litigation means to gain a 
foothold in markets being characterised by a former monopoly. A similarly high ratio of 
competitor cases was only observed in the non-regulated construction industry with 
45.5 per cent. In the electricity and gas sector customers‟ claims prevailed with 76.6 per 
cent within the industry. The high ratio of customer claims coincides with high electricity 
prices for end users in Germany. Since the Federal Network Agency only controls grid 
access and charges, the number of customer claims suggests a complementary 
function of private antitrust enforcement. As we would expect end users to suffer from 
high energy prices, this may also indicate that the category of customers also contains 
consumers or end users. The only identifiable consumer action took place in the 
electricity sector which is well known for its high consumer prices. Customer litigation 
was also observed in the wholesale and retail industry.  
 
4.4 Remedies and counterclaims 
This section looks at the remedies that were sought for the violation of European or 
German antitrust law. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants of the initial law suit may 
assert a breach of competition law, the former also being referred to as “sword” litigation 
and the latter being labelled as “shield”. At the outset, sword and shield cases were 
defined as antitrust litigation. However, if the defendant raised the antitrust issues, the 
case was also marked as being a counterclaim covering real counterclaims for 
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damages and pure shield defences such as voidness. The categories for remedies used 
in this study do not reflect the typical classification of claims available under German 
law. In general, the party affected by the breach of competition law may apply for a 
declaratory judgement, initiate an action in order to enjoin the other party to refrain from 
a certain conduct (injunction), ask for removal or request compensation. The following 
analysis looks mainly at the primarily requested remedies. 
 
Voidness is the only remedy provided for by Articles 101 and 102. The damages 
remedy or injunctions for a breach of EU antitrust law are safeguarded by the principle 
of effectiveness. 101(2) TFEU declares any agreement automatically void that violates 
Article 101(1) and does not fall under Article 101(3). The victim of a horizontal or vertical 
anticompetitive agreement can invoke the nullity of a contract before court even if he 
was part of the agreement.139 In addition to the European nullity remedy, section 134 of 
the German Civil Code orders a legal transaction void that violates a statutory 
prohibition unless the breached statute leads to a different conclusion. Contracts 
infringing national or EU competition law are normally rendered void under this 
provision. It is sometimes asserted that particularly defendants use the voidness tool in 
contract disputes.140 All other remedies like damages or restitution are provided for by 
national laws although Komninos holds the view that the ECJ‟s Crehan ruling 
established a community right for damages.141 As for injunctions, section 33(1) of the 
ARC states that if a provision of the ARC or European antitrust law is infringed and the 
violation found to be illegal, the infringer has to remediate the affected person. If a risk 
of recurrent infringements exists, which is normally presumed, an injunction will be 
granted requiring the defendant to do or refrain from doing certain acts. In this study, 
injunctions comprise of actions that are aimed at stopping an ongoing infringement or 
target impending violations.142 The action to refrain from certain conduct includes both 
negative duties (to refrain from something) but also obligations such as to further supply 
the plaintiff. According to sections 935 f of the Civil Procedure Rules plaintiffs can ask 
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for an injunction by way of interim relief. Interim relief is a preliminary and speedy 
remedy that, in theory, precludes a decision on the merits. For instance, to ensure that 
the supply to the plaintiff is continued for the time of the litigation process, the defendant 
may be forced to uphold deliveries temporarily by way of interim relief.143 
 
If the plaintiff seeks monetary relief, there are two alternative means which, depending 
on the circumstances, he could ask for: damages claims or unjust enrichment actions. 
Damages are aimed at the compensation of loss suffered from the infringement of 
competition law and do not include punitive elements as this would be against principle 
in German civil law. Damages actions do not solely consist of actions for affirmative 
relief but also incorporate declaratory requests. The latter is appropriate in situations in 
which the claimant is not yet able to specify the precise amount of damage suffered. In 
those circumstances the court will determine whether a violation occurred and the claim 
meets all other conditions apart from the actual amount of loss. Unjust enrichment 
claims are made under section 812 of the German Civil Code if a person obtains 
something as the result of the performance of another person without legal grounds. 
Usually, a contract provides the legal ground for a financial transfer. The party asking 
for repayment in a competition law context inherently postulates that the legal ground 
for the transaction is null and void due to an antitrust violation. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
Most frequently, antitrust plaintiffs invoked the nullity of a contract because of the 
violation of European or German competition law. Voidness requests represented 22.8 
per cent of all claims in the sample. Table 3 in the Appendix shows that most of these 
proceedings were initiated by customers (46.4 per cent) followed by competitors (27.4 
per cent). Permanent injunctions and interim injunctions were almost equally common 
with 51 (13.9 per cent) and 50 (13.6. per cent) cases respectively. Damages actions 
contribute moderately to private antitrust enforcement with 40 cases (11.4 per cent). 
Customers requested 50 per cent of the damages claims followed by franchisees with 
five compensation claims (12.5 per cent).144 If we add up damages claims and unjust 
enrichment proceedings which are both aimed at monetary relief, we observe a 
proportionally large number of cases that actually dealt with pecuniary requests. If we 
assign the requests to conclude or continue a contract to the injunction remedy, the 
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number of injunctions increases, too.145 I tried to capture the conclusion and 
continuation of contract separately in order to show that in some instances antitrust 
disputes arose from previous contracts between the parties (continuation of contract).  
The conclusion requests indicate that there was no agreement between the parties prior 
to litigation. In 37 cases I could establish the secondary claim of the antitrust plaintiff. 
Those were mostly damages requests (18 cases). Ten plaintiffs also asked for various 
other remedies, three for injunctions, one for voidness, three for conclusion or 
continuation of contract, and three for repayment because of unjust enrichment. 
 
In a number of cases defendants asserted that the plaintiff violated anticompetitive 
conduct in order to counter the plaintiff‟s claim. The term counterclaim was defined 
broadly comprising of real countersuits and pure defences such as voidness. The data 
shows that the defendant raised the competition law issues in 91 proceedings (24.7 per 
cent of all primary allegations). In 79 out of 91 cases defendants referred to the 
voidness of an agreement in their counterclaim which accounts for 86 per cent of all 
countersuits. Damages, injunction and interim relief in counterclaims were only sought 
twice respectively. There were two more instances of counteractions, one in which the 
claimant made the case for unjust enrichment and one in which the defendant wanted to 
continue a contract. 
 
Although antitrust damages actions form part of private litigation before the German 
courts they are not the typical antitrust case. The data does not reveal whether all 
damages claimants requested precise payments or whether they only sought a 
declaratory judgement. As requests for declaratory judgements are common in German 
civil law proceedings,146 I anticipated that some of those cases would (re)appear in 
order for the court to clarify the precise amount of damages. However, the dataset does 
not reveal cases in which the court established the amount of compensation on the 
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basis of a declaratory judgement. This may hint towards a settlement practice which is 
unobservable in the current data. Another interesting feature of German antitrust 
litigation is the widespread use of injunctions. However, the frequent employment of 
injunctions does not entirely fit into a private enforcement system that is said to be 
primarily aimed at compensation and, maybe, deterrence. We can only speculate why 
private enforcers prefer injunctive relief and request a “specific performance” from the 
defendant rather than seeking compensatory payments. It may matter that damages 
claims are expensive because of the tedious calculation of losses and the difficult proof 
for causation and harm. But it may also be the case that injunctions satisfy the need for 
remediation for which plaintiffs are willing to forego uncertain and difficult compensation 
in exchange for more certain and more immediate relief. It is interesting to note that 
unjust enrichment claims are used to enforce the antitrust rules too. Since no culpability 
or loss needs to be established, unjust enrichment is certainly a cheaper remedy than 
damages actions if the plaintiff‟s loss consists of a plain and reversible transfer of 
money. However, unjust enrichment claims inherently postulate the voidness of a 
contract between the victim and the perpetrator, thus, moving antitrust actions closer to 
contract litigation. There is probably a considerable overlap between contract and 
antitrust claims. This is supported by the large number of nullity request which are 
basically brought to fend off contractual obligations. Whether or not private actions 
interfere with contract disputes or distort civil litigation cannot be said without further 
scrutiny of the case law. 
 
4.5 Outcome 
Measuring the outcome of antitrust cases, I focused on the fate of the antitrust remedy 
and largely ignored the outcome of the general claim if the case proved to be a 
counterclaim. The antitrust plaintiff won a claim if both the substantive pleadings and the 
remedy were confirmed by the court. Partly won refers to outcomes in which, for 
instance, the judge lowered the amount of damages compared to the initial plea or 
granted an injunction that did not contain all the points requested. An antitrust action 
was characterised as being lost if the court did not find a breach of competition law or 
dismissed the claim. As this study focused on the antitrust problems raised by the 
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parties, there might be some proceedings in which the overall outcome for the antitrust 
plaintiffs was positive although the competition law claim was lost. Only the assertions 
of antitrust violations are captured in this study. 
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Table 3: Outcome of the antitrust claim 
 
 
Won 
Partially 
won 
Lost or 
dismissed 
Settled† Other 
Missing 
value 
Total 
1st instance Frequency 59 5 108 1 2 5 180 
 % of 1st inst 32.8 2.8 60 .6 1.1 2.8 100 
         
1st appeal* Frequency 53 9 93 2 1 6 164 
 % of appeal 32.3 5.5 56.7 1.2 .6 3.7 100 
         
BGH Frequency 11 . 13 . . . 24 
 % of BGH 45.8 . 54.2 . . . 100 
         
Total Frequency 123 14 214 3 3 11 368 
 % of total 33.4 3.8 58.2 .8 .8 3.0 100.0 
         
 
 
* 1
st
 appeal refers to appeals to the higher regional courts excluding appeals on questions of law to 
the Federal Court of Justice (BGH). 
† Settlements were discovered by chance. Current research indicates that there are more 
settled antitrust cases. 
 
 
Parties who brought forward allegations of anticompetitive conduct succeeded or partly 
succeeded in 37.2 per cent of all proceedings in the sample. The majority of antitrust 
claims were lost. Settlements were discovered by chance and do not allow any 
conclusions about the frequency of their occurrence. As settlements are not approved 
by the court, there is no information about the content of settlements and, therefore, no 
information about the relative success of the settling parties. Looking at the outcome of 
counterclaims, it appears that the chance of winning is not much greater than the 
average for the entire sample. 37.4 per cent of the counterclaims were partly or totally 
successful and 58.2 per cent lost.147 Separating first instance trials from cases decided 
on the first appeal level, the ratio of won and lost proceedings does not change 
significantly. In the first instance 60 per cent of the antitrust claims were lost and 35.6 
                                                          
147
 See Table 5 in Appendix.  
 53 
 
per cent won or partly won. On the appeal stage before the higher regional courts, 
antitrust plaintiffs (partially) succeeded in 37.8 per cent of all 1st appeal cases and lost 
56.7 per cent. Only appeals on questions of law to the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 
had a higher chance of success. Plaintiffs won 45.8 per cent and lost 54.2 of their BGH 
appeals. Bearing in mind that leave to appeal to the Federal Court of Justice has to be 
granted by the higher regional courts, this probably provides for a screening of 
potentially unsuccessful or hopeless cases and may, as a consequence, raise the 
success rate of the appeals that are decided on the merits. 
 
Analysing the data from a law and economic point of view, the ratio of lost and won 
cases leads to an interesting conclusion about the actual volume of private antitrust 
litigation. According to Bourjade et al, defendants who have committed an antitrust 
violation are more likely to settle out of court while those who are innocent are more 
likely to defend their case bringing the matter to court.148 The courts become the place 
where the innocent proves that he is innocent.149 Having discovered many lost cases 
and assuming that litigants do not overestimate their chances of success and do not 
commence hopeless legal actions, one could interpret the data as an indicator for a 
certain level of pre-trial settlement activity. Although the dataset disclosed only three 
proceedings in which the parties actually settled their dispute, the real number of 
settlements is presumably higher.150 The data does not contain confidential information 
about in-court or pre-trial settlements so it is hard to estimate the true magnitude of 
litigation. Looking at the findings of the Georgetown Study, according to which 75 per 
cent of all US procedures were finally settled, the observed amount of antitrust litigation 
in Germany seems to be rather the tip of the iceberg than the maximum number of 
antitrust disputes. 
 
The success rate for the various remedies described in the previous subsection differs 
greatly as it is shown in Figure 5. Plaintiffs who requested a payback because of a void 
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 37.2 per cent of all cases are still won. This could mean that some guilty defendants do not settle or that there is 
an element of uncertainty about the infringement or causation. It may also hint towards judicial error and judges 
wrongly acquitting the defendant. 
150
 That was signalled by practitioners too. See also Rinne and Mühlbach (n 147). 
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contract, won in more than 50 of the cases. „Pure‟ injunctions, not taking into account 
continuation or conclusion of contracts, proved a relatively successful remedy as well. 
As for interim relief, the success rate is around 40 per cent. Experience suggests that 
many requests for interim injunctions are struck down because a decision in favour of 
the applicant would anticipate a decision on the merits or lacks the urgency required. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
Victims who actually sought compensation for the harm caused by anticompetitive 
conduct had the lowest chance of success. This may hint towards the intrinsic 
difficulties of the damages remedies: plaintiffs have to prove just more facts than for all 
other remedies. This is not a deficit but the nature of compensation claims. On the other 
hand, one could think that the low success rate proves the existence of obstacles 
dampening the incentives to request compensation. A third possible explanation for the 
unfavourable outcome for damages plaintiffs might be a higher settlement rate in 
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damages cases which is not captured by my data. From the defendant‟s point of view, 
damages claims may present a higher financial risk than requests for injunctions, for 
instance. The likelihood of higher payments if the trial is lost might induce earlier or 
more settlements. To prove this point, we would need more information about settled 
antitrust disputes. The relatively low success rate of damages claims does not allow 
robust conclusions without a thorough case by case analysis of those actions. Only a 
qualitative study would reveal the reasons for plaintiffs‟ failure in each individual case. 
From the current viewpoint, it would be a fallacy to interpret the low success rate other 
than as an indicator for more complex litigation. Apart from damages actions, German 
law provides for another monetary relief that may offset the rather gloomy prospect of 
compensatory claims. Unjust enrichment requests had the greatest success rate of all 
remedies and were three times more promising than damages claims. The contrary 
success rate of unjust enrichment and damages claims, the former is on top in Figure 5 
while the latter is at the bottom, will be subject to further investigation. In this context, I 
will also analyse the relation between contract and antitrust litigation. Since unjust 
enrichment actions are based on void contracts it poses the question where the 
boundary between antitrust and contract litigation lies. 
 
4.6 Statute violation 
The substantive and procedural legal framework for claims against breaches of 
competition law has been outlined above.151 Statutory infringements which were brought 
forward by antitrust litigants were sorted into four categories reflecting the coarse 
classification in the FCO‟s lists of decision. Violations of the antitrust laws could fall 
under Article 81 (now 101 TFEU), Article 82 (now 102 TFEU), sections 1 to 18 or 19 to 
21 ARC.152 Article 101 and section 1 ARC prohibit horizontal and vertical agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted 
practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of 
competition. Section 2 ARC contains a provision similar to Article 101(3). Prior to the 7th 
amendment of the ARC, which came into effect on 1 July 2005, vertical agreements 
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 See section B.II. 
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 To avoid confusion and since no substantive changes to the EU competition law provisions were made with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, I will refer to the actual numbering of the Articles according to the TFEU. 
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were not included in section 1 ARC. Like Article 102 section 19 ARC prohibits the abuse 
of dominance. Unlike EU competition law, section 20 forbids discrimination and unfair 
hindrance by a non-dominant undertaking if small and medium-sized firms depend on it 
as suppliers or purchasers (economic dependency). A medium-sized undertaking is 
dependent if it cannot reasonably switch to other suppliers or purchasers or switching is 
not sufficiently possible. Due to the lack of data, section 19 and 20 ARC were not 
distinguished in the study. Section 21 prohibits calls for boycotts against other 
undertakings and threatening behaviour to induce third parties to carry out actions that 
are prohibited under the ARC. The category “other” refers to special norms, for 
instance, in energy and telecommunication sectors or regulations of resale price 
maintenance for books. The following analysis focuses on the primarily alleged statute 
violation. 
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Table 4: Primarily alleged statute violation 
  
Frequency % of EU competition law % of total 
EU 
competition 
law 
Art 101 TFEU 49 74.2 13.3 
Art 102 TFEU 17 25.8 4.6 
Subtotal EU law 66 100 17.9 
   % of German competition law  
German 
competition 
law 
Section 1-18 ARC 71 25.1 19.3 
Sections 19-21 ARC 212 74.9 57.6 
Subtotal German law 283 100 76.9 
     
 Other 18 . 4.9 
 Missing value 1 . .3 
 Total 368 . 100.0 
 
 
Of 368 primarily alleged statutory violations 212 (57.6 per cent) dealt with unilateral 
conduct under German law. Horizontal and vertical anticompetitive arrangements 
violating German antitrust regulations accounted for 19.3 per cent of all cases. Plaintiffs 
referred to infringements of EU antitrust rules less often: 13.3 per cent asserted an 
anticompetitive horizontal or vertical agreement while only 4.6 per cent of all cases dealt 
with the breach of Article 101. Separating cases in which EU law was primarily brought 
forward from litigation in which plaintiffs alleged a violation of German law shows that 
the proportion of anticompetitive agreements and unilateral conduct are reversed. 
Accusations of unilateral conduct dominated antitrust litigation based on German law 
with 74.9 per cent of German competition law cases. If the claims were based on EU 
competition law, 74.2 per cent of the antitrust plaintiffs asserted an anticompetitive 
agreement under Article 101 TFEU. 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of primary allegations brought in regulated and 
unregulated industries. Litigation in regulated and partly regulated sectors was mainly 
founded on unilateral conduct (section 19 to 21 ARC). Unless most litigation is based on 
economic dependency according to section 20 ARC – a hypothesis I cannot test with 
the current dataset – the results indicate that regulated sectors are still characterised by 
at least one firm enjoying a dominant position.153 Litigation in unregulated industries 
dealt more often with anticompetitive horizontal or vertical agreements. Especially the 
sharp increase of Article 101 cases from 2.2 per cent in regulated industries to 23.9 per 
cent in unregulated sectors stands out. A fraction of this litigation goes back to disputes 
over Regulation 1400/2002 but there also other cases in the wholesale and retail trade 
sector that contributed to this rise.  
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Two points arise from the data presented in this subsection. The first question is why 
the proportions of unilateral conduct and anticompetitive agreements are reversed if we 
separate claims based on German law from those relying on EU law. One could think 
that this was caused by the wider concept of unilateral conduct that underpins German 
competition law. The discrimination prohibition laid out in section 20 ARC does not 
require dominance if the victim depends economically on the defendant. Apart from 
lowering the threshold for antitrust claims, providing the evidence for economic 
dependency may be easier because information such as data about the supplier 
relationships and sales data are located in the plaintiff‟s own sphere. From a potential 
plaintiff‟s point of view section 20 ARC lowers the hurdles for antitrust litigation. 
However, in the absence of precise data it is difficult to reject or confirm this hypothesis. 
On the other hand, it is claimed that anticompetitive behaviour under section 20 ARC 
could, as long as it takes place within a contractual relationship, well fit under 
Article 101.154 This may provide another explanation for the reversed ratio of Article 101 
and section 1 ARC litigation. If the anticompetitive behaviour affects the trade between 
Member States, European antitrust law is applied. If the inter-state-trade clause and 
consequently Article 101 are not applicable, a case might be easier to sustain under 
section 20 ARC than a claim brought under section 1 ARC. The apparent difference in 
the enforcement pattern is perhaps not so different in the end if economic dependency 
allegations can actually be converted into Article 101 accusations.155 
 
The second issue originates from the fact that EU competition rules are less often 
applied than German competition law. At a first glance, the European Commission 
appears to be right pointing at the underdeveloped private enforcement of the European 
antitrust law. However, this narrow interpretation may miss the point. Under the 
Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 the laws of the Member States cannot longer provide 
for rules that differ from Article 101. Only for the regulation of market power, the 
Modernisation Regulation permits a deviation of national provisions. Thus, while 
counting private cases dealing with EU antitrust rules, we also need to take into account 
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litigation that is based on identical national prohibitions. There are several possible 
reasons why plaintiffs do not bring cases under European law or judges hesitate to 
apply them. First, the remedies are arranged for by national law. Thus, it does not make 
a difference for a claim whether it is based on a violation of Article 101 or section 1 
ARC, for example. Therefore, claimants and judges may rely on provisions they are 
more familiar with. Second, if the judge applies Articles 101 or 102, the plaintiff must 
show that there is an effect on trade between the Member States. This could render 
procedure more expensive and time-consuming. If there is an equally effective but less 
costly alternative in the form of national competition law, the plaintiff‟s choice is not 
difficult to predict. Third, the differing concepts of the abuse of market power under EU 
and German law may motivate victims of anticompetitive conduct to focus on national 
competition law. The concept of unilateral behaviour is said to be broader under the 
ARC than under Article 102 EC.156 
 
4.7 Anticompetitive behaviour 
Allegations concerning the illegal conduct play a somewhat interesting role in the 
judges‟ reasoning. While conducting this survey, it was often difficult to establish the 
theory of harm or the precise anticompetitive conduct underpinning the antitrust claims. 
Allegations were phrased in a rather broad way so as to cover several types of 
anticompetitive conduct. For instance, a plaintiff asserted discriminatory behaviour in 
very broad terms, so that it would cover unfair pricing but also other discriminatory 
conduct. Without access to the claimants‟ statements, I used the broad description of 
anticompetitive conduct as the basis for my study. Even for cases I traced back and 
recovered a copy of the decision, the description of the conduct in question was 
moderate. In the dataset I distinguished 12 types of anticompetitive behaviour in private 
antitrust proceedings. Table 5 shows the anticompetitive conduct that was primarily 
claimed starting with Article 101-type behaviour on the top, presenting vertical restraints 
in the middle and finishing with abuse of market power at the bottom. 
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Only a few cases dealt with hard-core cartels. In ten cases allegations of horizontal 
price fixing were brought forward. Other horizontal agreements included quotas, bid 
rigging allegations and assertions of anticompetitive non-compete clauses. Non-
compete clauses are a routine element of contracts between businesses or 
shareholders and often turned out to be the reason for the legal dispute. In 19 cases 
antitrust plaintiffs accused the other side of resale price maintenance. Tying 
arrangements were less often the source of antitrust litigation with just five cases 
observed. Other vertical agreements like single branding, export bans, customer 
allocation, and anticompetitive franchise agreements accounted for 35 cases. As we 
have already observed above, a considerable number of plaintiffs asked the court to 
order a conclusion of contract or to continue a contract with the defendant. This is 
reflected in the number of proceedings that are based on a refusal to deal (60 cases) or 
an alleged anticompetitive termination of a contract (24 cases). The abuse of 
dominance or relative market power (economic dependency) accounted for the majority 
of accusations.  
 
 
Table 5: Primarily claimed anticompetitive conduct 
 Frequency Percent 
Horizontal price fixing 11 3.0 
Other horizontal violations 25 6.8 
Resale price maintenance 19 5.2 
Tying 5 1.4 
Other vertical violations 35 9.5 
Exclusive dealing 14 3.8 
Termination of contract  24 6.5 
Refusal to deal or supply 60 16.3 
Excessive pricing 44 12.0 
Predatory pricing 6 1.6 
Price discrimination 23 6.2 
Non-price discrimination 51 13.9 
Other 24 6.5 
Missing value 27 7.3 
Total 368 100.0 
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The number of hard-core cartel cases is very small and comprises of just 3 per cent of 
all proceedings in this sample despite the importance that is attached to price-fixing 
allegations in the policy discussion. One potential reason lies within the secrecy of 
cartels and the difficulties of filing stand-alone actions against them. In the absence of 
discovery mechanisms or information about the existence of cartels, plaintiffs need a 
signal and evidence stemming from public investigations.157 As we have seen above, 
the FCO concluded just a few investigations with a formal decision between 2005 and 
2007. Hence, plaintiffs either do not learn about an infringement at all or wait (in vain) 
for a public signal to follow. I already pointed out that the protective scope requirement 
may have hampered damages actions until 2005. Some argue that other factors such 
as the lack of representative consumer or class actions or the unclear status of the 
passing-on defence in Germany cause the small number of cases.158 
 
Dividing the cases into regulated and unregulated industries, defendants in regulated 
industries faced more often than not accusations of unfair or excessive pricing. The data 
indicate that excessive pricing allegations were particularly frequent in the electricity and 
gas sector (see Table 4 in Appendix). But also in transportation industries, information 
and telecommunication markets unfair pricing accounted for the bulk of the claims. The 
plaintiffs in these three regulated industries also brought actions for the refusal to deal 
or to supply. Overall, regulated markets tend to have pricing problems or what plaintiffs 
perceive as such according to my data. These findings are underpinned by various 
reports of the German Monopoly Commission pointing out that railway networks, 
telecommunication, postal services and, especially, energy markets suffer from 
distorted competition.159 Whether or not this is a sign of regulatory failure will be subject 
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Wettbewerbsentwicklung bei der Post 2005: Beharren auf alten Privilegien: Sondergutachten der 
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to further analysis. Anticompetitive conduct violating Article 101 or sections 1-18 ARC 
occurred more often in unregulated sectors. 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
 
The high ratio of disputes in vertical relationships and against dominant firms for unfair 
pricing and other discriminatory conduct raises concerns with regard to contract 
litigation. Obviously, plaintiffs who were part of the contract with the infringer face fewer 
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difficulties in gathering evidence or discovering the infringement in the first place.160 
During the data gathering it became apparent that the antitrust issue was often 
accompanied by a contract law issue dispute or that antitrust violation was an annex to 
the contract claim. Due to the fact that I excluded cases from my sample in which the 
antitrust issues could not be clarified, it is likely that even more of these contract 
disputes exist. Walter van Gerven characterised this type of contractual litigation being 
the rather typical case of private antitrust enforcement.161  
 
4.8 Length of trial 
When faced with the decision of whether or not to bring a dispute before court, the 
estimated length of the proceedings is a factor likely to influence the parties‟ decision. 
The prospect of several years of dispute before a final decision is handed down will 
deter requests for redress of losses or other remediation. Court procedures that take a 
long time increase the legal cost for both plaintiffs and defendants and may force 
economically weaker plaintiffs or defendants to prematurely settle the case. As for the 
duration of antitrust cases in Germany, there are some limitations in calculating the 
length of proceedings. Although the exact date of the decision is known for 365 cases 
out of 368 there is no publicly available information about the starting date. Only access 
to the strictly confidential court records would reveal the precise date on which the 
plaintiffs commenced their legal action. However, the record number of each decision 
contains the year in which a proceeding was initiated in a particular instance. 
Unfortunately, it does not indicate when the case as a whole was commenced because 
cases are assigned a new record number in each instance. As long as a case ended in 
the first instance with a decision of a regional court, the length of the proceeding in this 
instance equaled the duration of the whole case. If cases were appealed to the higher 
regional courts or the Federal Court of Justice, the data only tell us about the time 
period the case needed in a particular appeal instance. In order to determine a proxy for 
the length of a proceeding before a given court I assumed that each case started at the 
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beginning of the year indicated in the record number. This is probably too conservative 
a measure and will exaggerate the time span litigants spent in a given instance. 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
 
 
The minimum time parties spent in court was one month while the maximum time span 
amounted to 175 months in one proceeding. On average, courts handed down their 
decisions after 17.01 months. Looking at the different remedies, the courts needed very 
little time in interim proceedings. Requests for interim relief were answered in 8.4 
months while a decision on damages needed 28.98 months on average (40 
observations). Experience suggests that interim proceedings take less time and the 
estimated time period exaggerates the actual length. The histogram in Figure 8 shows 
us the distribution of the length of proceedings in months. Courts concluded the majority 
of cases in a give instance within 2 years. But we also observe several outliers with the 
longest proceedings lasting for 175 months which is more than 14 years. Of the four 
cases that last longer than 100 months three dealt with damages and one with a 
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voidness request. Ignoring those particularly long-lasting proceedings, the mean length 
of the proceedings for damages claims drops to 20.73 month (based on 37 decisions 
instead of 40). This is not far off from injunctions which needed 19.25 months to be 
finally decided. The 84 voidness assertions in the sample were dealt with within 17.51 
months (or 16.3 if the one proceeding that lasted more than 100 months is not taken 
into account). As for the remaining remedies, the continuation of contracts needed 
16.25 months per instance, conclusion of contract requests required only 11.84 and 
unjust enrichment claims were dealt with in 18.14 months. Other claims lasted 16.49 
months per instance. 
 
Although the method of estimating the length of antitrust litigation suffers from several 
flaws it provides the best proxy we can establish given the data. Not surprisingly, 
damages procedures tend to last longer than other remedies. The data confirms that 
interim relief was granted in much less time than other remedies. By contrast, 
injunctions or unjust enrichment claims required more time until judges handed down 
their decisions on the merits. The results of this estimation as well as extensions, for 
instance, with respect to the length of follow-on and stand-alone claims will be tested 
with the new dataset as it also contains the precise start date for some cases. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Numerous contributions in Europe and Germany have dealt with the legal aspects of 
private antitrust enforcement. Many observers claim that private antitrust actions have 
been in a dire state in both Europe and Germany. However, looking at private antitrust 
enforcement in Germany, the empirical basis for those claims is weak. Private litigation 
for the violation of German and European competition law is widespread and manifold in 
shape. The contrast between my findings and the dominant notion in the literature is 
best exemplified with a statement from the German Monopoly Commission, an advising 
body of lawyers and economists, from 2001: 
 “The Monopolies Commission wishes to affirm the doubts it has already expressed that a system 
that is largely based on litigation on private initiative can offer a suitable substitute for protection 
 67 
 
of competition largely by authorities. [...] Moreover, companies in continental European member 
states are still very reluctant to claim damages for restrictive practices and agreements. It can be 
pointed out that so far there have been virtually no cases of this kind, and their practical 
importance can generally be regarded as marginal.”
 162 
 
Although the comment stems from 2001 while my study covers the years 2005 to 2007 
it is unlikely that the number of private antitrust cases increased dramatically within four 
years. More important though is that the statement points towards a misconception of 
private antitrust enforcement. 
 
Private actions are often reduced to damages litigation for the violation of EU 
competition law. With such a narrow focus, the European Commission rightly points out 
that there are not many cases even with respect to Germany. However, to conclude that 
private actions do not exist or do not play a role in the overall enforcement scheme 
jumps the gun. My data have shown that parties employed various remedies including 
unjust enrichment requests and injunctions in order to pursue a breach of the 
competition rules. Private enforcement rather supplements public enforcement picking 
up infringements that have less impact on the economy as a whole instead of 
duplicating public investigations into hard-core violations. For example, plaintiffs initiated 
proceedings against dominant firms which were not investigated by the competition 
authorities due to disproportionate cost or insignificant impact on the economy as a 
whole. It may be wrong to assume that private parties will take on hard-core violations in 
the first place. Thus, the question is which types of infringement private enforcers are 
supposed to pursue. Should they aim at hard-core violations? Or is it sufficient if 
antitrust plaintiffs complement public enforcement targeting “softer” infringements? 
 
My data have also shown that in many instances private cases are closely related to 
contract disputes. Contract cases are met with suspicion in US antitrust law because it 
is thought that they are used to exploit defendants and distort competition law by means 
of the treble damages award. However, this concern only holds if the rules under which 
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 Monopolkommission, Folgeprobleme der europäischen Kartellverfahrensreform: Sondergutachten der 
Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB (Bonn 2001) 66. 
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antitrust cases are litigated differ from those for contracts. As there are generally no 
special rules for antitrust claims in Germany, antitrust litigation in contract relationships 
may not be such a worrying problem after all. This will certainly change if special rules 
for damages actions for the violation of EU competition law are created as suggested by 
the European Commission.163 
 
As for the application of EU competition law, we have seen that plaintiffs were rather 
reluctant to base their claims on Articles 101 or 102. However, if private enforcers pick 
up infringements that are on smaller scale, it is doubtful that those cases meet the 
interstate trade criterion in the first place. Taking into account that most national 
antitrust provisions resemble European competition law rules, the application of national 
or European competition law may not make a huge difference. 
 
The question that remains unanswered is why we observe many cases despite the lack 
of class actions, contingency fee agreements or damages multipliers which drive 
litigation in the United States. I would suspect that the low and, maybe, predictable 
litigation cost provide for lower litigation barriers and, thus, motivate plaintiffs to bring 
their disputes to the court. The absence of costly discovery would argue in the same 
vein. One could also assert that Germany is characterised by a litigation culture in which 
victims of anticompetitive behaviour refer to the courts to remediate their harm. After all, 
my research indicates that we missed some important points in the discussion about the 
strengthening of private enforcement. 
 
The observations and questions from this empirical work were incorporated in a second 
study on private antitrust litigation in Germany. The analysis of this broader and more 
precise dataset is currently under way. But even without new data, two points emerged 
that will be addressed separately. First, the data showed that plaintiffs were hesitant to 
resort to damages actions. This raises the question whether damages claims should be 
strengthened and, if so, how. The damages actions reform initiated by the European 
                                                          
163
 Why only antitrust damages actions should be strengthened, in contrast to other areas of law, is another question 
that has not been answered yet. 
 69 
 
Commission provides for a starting point but needs to be assessed in the light of the 
new data.164 Second, we have observed that injunctions are widely and successfully 
used in antitrust cases in Germany. What the data could not tell is why they are so 
important and dominant. This will be the guiding question for yet another research 
project. 
 
Overall, the nature of private actions in Germany and, maybe, in Europe has been 
misjudged. It seems that there are many situations in which injunctions or interim relief 
satisfy the plaintiff without the need for compensation. Consequently, the question 
German and European legislators have to ask is what type of private enforcement 
system they want and on which assumptions potential legislative measures will be 
based. The complete underdevelopment of all private actions in Germany and, 
consequently, in Europe is certainly a myth. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table1  Private antitrust cases per federal state† 
Federal state Frequency Percent 
Baden-Württemberg 27 7.3 
Bavaria 60 16.3 
Berlin 14 3.8 
Brandenburg 6 1.6 
Bremen 2 .5 
Hamburg 7 1.9 
Hesse 36 9.8 
Lower Saxony 8 2.2 
North Rhine-Westphalia 153 41.6 
Rhineland-Palatinate 8 2.2 
Saxony 7 1.9 
Saxony-Anhalt 1 .3 
Schleswig-Holstein 11 3.0 
Thuringia 4 1.1 
BGH* 24 6.5 
Total 368 100.0 
 
* The BGH is a Federal court and has its seat in Karlsruhe 
† There are two Federal States missing for which no cases were reported: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and 
Saarland. 
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Table 2: Crosstabulation of industry and business relationship 
    
Party who claims antitrust violation is… 
   
Competitor 
Dealer or 
supplier 
Customer 
Final 
customer 
Other* Total 
In
d
u
stry 
Manufacturing Count 4 2 14 0 6 26 
% within Industry 15.4 7.7 53.8 .0 22.9 100.0 
Electricity, gas, steam, air 
conditioning 
Count 5 2 36 1 3 47 
% within Industry 10.6 4.3 76.6 2.1 6.4 100.0 
Water, sewerage, waste, 
remediation 
Count 1 0 4 0 0 5 
% within Industry 20.0 .0 80.0 .0 .0 100.0 
Construction Count 5 1 4 0 1 11 
% within Industry 45.5 9.1 36.4 .0 9.1 100.0 
Wholesale, retail trade Count 6 3 48 0 17 74 
% within Industry 8.1 4.1 64.9 .0 23.1 100.0 
Accommodation and food 
service  
Count 0 0 5 0 5 10 
% within Industry .0 .0 50.0 .0 50.0 100.0 
Transport and storage Count 12 0 23 0 4 39 
% within Industry 30.8 .0 59.0 .0 10.3 100.0 
Information and 
communication 
Count 21 1 18 0 4 44 
% within Industry 47.7 2.3 40.9 .0 9.1 100.0 
Financial and insurance Count 1 0 4 0 0 5 
% within Industry 20.0 .0 80.0 .0 .0 100.0 
Professional, scientific, 
technical activities 
Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% within Industry 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
Administrative and 
support service 
Count 1 0 10 0 3 14 
% within Industry 7.1 .0 71.4 .0 21.3 100.0 
Human health, social work  Count 1 0 2 0 0 3 
% within Industry 33.3 .0 66.7 .0 .0 100.0 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
Count 2 1 11 0 7 21 
% within Industry 9.5 4.8 52.4 .0 33.3 100.0 
Other service activities Count 0 0 2 0 0 2 
% within Industry .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 100.0 
Missing value Count 5 2 31 0 28 66 
% within Industry 7.6 3.0 47.0 .0 42.4 100.0 
Total Count 65 12 212 1 88 368 
% within Industry 17.7 3.3 57.6 .3 21.2 100.0 
    
  
*Other includes franchisees, licensees. indirect purchasers and missing values 
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Table 3: Crosstabulation of primary remedy and business relationship 
   
    Party who claims antitrust violation is… 
    
C
o
m
p
etito
r 
D
ealer o
r 
su
p
p
lier 
C
u
sto
m
er 
Fran
ch
isee 
Licen
see 
En
d
 u
ser 
In
d
irect 
p
u
rch
aser 
O
th
er 
M
issin
g valu
e 
To
tal 
P
rim
ary rem
ed
y 
Damages 1 1 20 5 1 0 1 1 10 40 
Injunction 13 3 23 1 3 0 0 1 7 51 
Voidness 23 4 39 6 8 0 0 0 4 84 
Interim relief 16 1 24 1 0 1 0 1 6 50 
Other 6 2 34 1 0 0 0 0 3 46 
Continuation of contract 0 1 11 1 1 0 0 1 1 16 
Conclusion of contract 1 0 33 0 0 0 0 2 2 38 
Unjust enrichment 3 0 21 3 0 0 0 0 2 29 
Missing value 2 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 4 14 
Total 65 12 212 18 14 1 1 6 39 368 
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Table 4: Crosstabulation of primarily alleged anticompetitive conduct and industry 
 H
o
rizo
n
tal p
rice 
fixin
g 
O
th
er h
o
rizo
n
tal 
vio
latio
n
s 
V
ertical p
rice fixin
g 
Tyin
g 
O
th
er vertical 
vio
latio
n
s 
Exclu
sive d
ealin
g 
Term
in
atio
n
 o
f 
co
n
tract 
R
efu
sal to
 d
eal o
r 
su
p
p
ly 
Excessive o
r 
exp
lo
itative p
ricin
g 
P
red
ato
ry  p
ricin
g 
P
rice d
iscrim
in
atio
n
 
N
o
n
-p
rice 
d
iscrim
in
atio
n
 
O
th
er 
M
issin
g valu
e 
To
tal 
Manufacturing 4 2 0 0 4 1 1 2 0 0 0 11 1 0 26 
Electricity, gas, 
steam, air 
conditioning 
0 1 1 0 0 1 3 8 20 0 6 1 4 2 47 
Water, 
sewerage, waste 
and remediation 
0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 
Construction 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 11 
Wholesale and 
retail trade; 
repair of motor 
vehicles  
0 6 8 2 20 5 5 12 1 0 2 8 3 2 74 
Accommodation 
and food service 
0 0 2 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Transport and 
storage 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 1 8 5 2 3 39 
Information and 
communication 
0 4 2 1 0 1 1 9 8 2 2 9 2 3 44 
Financial and 
insurance 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 
Professional, 
scientific, 
technical 
activities 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Administrative 
support services 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 0 1 0 4 1 0 14 
Human health 
and social work 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 
Arts, recreation, 
entertainment 
0 3 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 3 3 3 1 21 
Other services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Missing value 2 3 3 2 6 3 7 11 4 1 2 0 7 15 66 
Total 11 25 19 5 35 14 24 60 44 6 23 51 24 27 368 
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Table 5: Outcome of antitrust counterclaims 
 Number Percent Cumulative Percent 
Won 32 35.2 35.2 
Partially won 2 2.2 37.4 
Lost/Dismissed 53 58.2 95.6 
Settled 3 3.3 98.9 
Missing value 1 1.1 100.0 
Total 91 100.0  
 
 
 
 
